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  INTRODUCTION   
Ever since Adam Smith, economists have recognized that 
nation-states play an important role in subsidizing the produc-
tion of knowledge goods.1 The simple case for state subsidiza-
tion goes as follows: Self-interested individuals and firms will 
devote their time and money toward producing knowledge 
goods only up to the point that the marginal benefit they reap 
from the investment exceeds the marginal cost. Yet persons 
other than the producer also benefit from new knowledge 
goods, and unless the producer takes the interests of these oth-
ers into account, she will invest less than the socially optimal 
amount. This is where nation-states enter the picture. States 
can encourage the provision of knowledge goods by enhancing 
the private rewards to producers or by reducing producers’ 
costs. By doing either (or both), nation-states can bring invest-
ment in knowledge-good provision closer to the socially optimal 
level. 
Smith suggested that “the easiest and most natural way in 
which the state can recompense” producers of knowledge goods 
is by granting them a “temporary monopoly”—that is, a patent 
or copyright.2 Intellectual property (IP) rights enhance produc-
ers’ rewards by allowing them to charge higher prices. In this 
respect, IP is akin to a tax on knowledge goods, with the reve-
nues going to knowledge-good producers.3 But IP has a poten-
 
 1. By “knowledge good,” we mean (appropriating economist Hal Varian’s 
definition) “anything that can be digitized.” HAL VARIAN, MARKETS FOR IN-
FORMATION GOODS 3 (1999). Books, blueprints, films, and pharmaceutical for-
mulas are all examples of knowledge goods. We use the term “nation-state” to 
distinguish national-level actors (our “nation-states”) from subnational actors 
(such as U.S. states and Canadian provinces) as well as supranational actors 
(such as the United Nations and the European Union). See, e.g., ERNST B. 
HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION 26 (1964). 
 2. 3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 143–44 (4th ed. London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell 1786) 
(bk. V, ch. 1, para. 119). 
 3. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When 
Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 54 (2002); 
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes De-
bate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 312–14, 371–73 (2013). 
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tially undesirable feature: it functions as a concentrated tax on 
a subset of goods. A concentrated tax is generally less efficient 
than a uniform tax on all goods (or equivalently, a tax on labor 
income).4 Accordingly, scholars of law and economics often de-
scribe IP as a “second-best” mechanism for encouraging the 
provision of knowledge goods—inferior to incentives financed 
through broad-based taxation.5 
Notwithstanding this undesirable feature of IP, most na-
tion-states do use patents and copyrights to recompense pro-
ducers of knowledge goods.6 But many nation-states simultane-
ously subsidize the production of knowledge goods through 
other mechanisms, such as prizes, grants, and tax credits.7 Na-
tion-states also support technological innovation by conducting 
research in-house, through agencies such as the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health and the U.K. National Physical Laborato-
ry.8 States generally fund these non-IP mechanisms through 
broad-based taxes rather than concentrated taxes on certain 
goods.9 For this reason, non-IP incentives in many circum-
 
 4. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 314–15 (citing Steven Shavell 
& Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. 
& ECON. 525, 526–627 (2001)). For a clear explanation of the equivalence be-
tween a labor income tax and a uniform tax on all goods, see Joseph Bankman 
& David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an 
Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1417–18 (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Gene Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, International Protection 
of Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1640 (2004); see also Amy 
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 
2014, at 131, 133 (“[M]any leading economists—including, most famously, No-
bel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow—have suggested that the most efficient 
means to promote information production involves not exclusion rights but 
public procurement.”). For a discussion of the compensating benefits of “user 
pays” incentives like IP, see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 350–51. 
 6. Following the international IP literature, we consider copyright along-
side patents. But as discussed below, we are skeptical of how well the conven-
tional economic account of IP treaties fits for creative works. Trade secrets, 
while not the focus here, serve similar functions to patents. See Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008). Trademarks have some limited similarities to public 
goods, see David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 22, 24 (2006), but are best justified on other grounds, see, e.g., 
Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
137, 172 (2010). 
 7. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 315–26. 
 8. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Response, Tailoring Incentives: A 
Comment on Hemel and Ouellette’s Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. SEE ALSO 131, 132 (2014). 
 9. Non-IP incentives could be financed through a sales tax on knowledge 
goods, which would lead to the same inefficiency as the IP “tax.” See Hemel & 
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stances may be more efficient than patents and copyrights: 
they may yield the same output of knowledge goods while gen-
erating less deadweight loss (and also posing fewer deterrents 
to cumulative innovation).10 
Yet the same characteristics of knowledge goods that give 
rise to the argument for state subsidization also engender a 
challenge for nation-states that seek to subsidize knowledge 
production in an interconnected world. First, knowledge goods 
are generally nonrivalrous: the fact that a person in another 
country watches the same movie as you or uses the same drug 
does not decrease your enjoyment of the good—and may even 
increase it. (Antibiotics are an exception.)11 Second, knowledge 
goods are only partially excludable: in the absence of IP law, 
the producer of a knowledge good cannot always prevent others 
from using the good without payment. (Think unauthorized 
movie downloads and generic drugs.)12 Where the first charac-
teristic (nonrivalrousness) is present, the global benefit from 
the production of a new knowledge good is greater than the 
benefit to the citizens of any one nation-state. And where the 
second characteristic (nonexcludability) is present, citizens of 
other countries can free-ride off the efforts of the nation-state 
that pays the subsidy. Rational, self-interested nation-states 
will finance knowledge goods only up to the point that the mar-
ginal cost equals the marginal benefit to their own citizens. 
This means that absent international coordination, nation-
states will subsidize knowledge goods at less than the globally 
optimal level.13 
Notably, this prediction applies to IP and non-IP innova-
tion incentives alike. Absent coordination, rational self-
 
Ouellette, supra note 3, at 347; Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus 
Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1058–59 (2014). 
 10. By “deadweight loss,” we mean the economic inefficiency that results 
from foregone transactions when the price of a product exceeds its marginal 
cost. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION & INCENTIVES 36 (2004); see also 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1059–64 (2005) (reviewing the costs of IP protection). 
 11. See infra note 41. 
 12. This is not to say that generics are costless to produce; rather, reverse 
engineering a drug and relying on clinical trial data showing it is effective is 
simply far cheaper than producing this knowledge in the first place. See Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? Fol-
low-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELE-
COMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 302 (2010). 
 13. Of course, not all knowledge goods have these characteristics requir-
ing state intervention. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
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interested nation-states will protect IP only insofar as the mar-
ginal benefit to their citizens from additional IP protection (in 
the form of increased innovation) exceeds the marginal cost (in-
cluding deadweight loss). Such states will apply a similar calcu-
lus when deciding how much to subsidize the production of 
knowledge goods through broad-based taxation. This is not to 
suggest that rational and self-interested nation-states will offer 
no innovation inducements; rather, this logic suggests that 
state investment in innovation will be globally suboptimal 
(though likely not zero). 
But there is one important difference between IP and non-
IP incentives that alters this prediction. Most nation-states 
(164 in all) have signed and ratified the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which 
requires all except the least-developed countries to protect IP at 
or above a minimum level.14 That is, nation-states have re-
sponded to the collective-action problem by virtually all agree-
ing to support the production of knowledge goods through IP 
protection. There is no equivalent with respect to non-IP mech-
anisms—no large-scale international agreement obligating na-
tion-states to pay for prizes, grants, tax credits, or in-house 
government research. The only comprehensive solution to the 
problem of knowledge-goods provision that nation-states have 
struck is an IP solution. 
The fact that nation-states have chosen to use internation-
al IP treaties—rather than non-IP mechanisms—to coordinate 
their subsidies for knowledge-good production presents some-
thing of a puzzle: If IP protection yields greater deadweight loss 
than non-IP innovation incentives, why have states settled up-
on IP as a solution to their collective-action problem?15 Why not, 
 
 14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see 
also Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated July 29, 2016); Re-
sponding to Least Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm 
(last updated Oct. 16, 2013). 
 15. Note that we are not asking “why” in the sense of seeking the stated 
motivations of the primary actors involved in treaty negotiations. We are ask-
ing why these multinationals focused on IP rather than an alternative rent-
extraction tool, and why other nation-states were willing to sign on. For a 
leading examination of the role of U.S. multinationals in bringing TRIPS into 
being, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). 
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say, a global treaty requiring signatory states to allocate a per-
centage of gross domestic product to research and develop-
ment?16 Or why not, as Joseph Stiglitz has proposed, a global 
prize fund financed by national governments that rewards in-
novators in targeted fields (e.g., medical knowledge)?17 
A possible answer is that a treaty focused on non-IP mech-
anisms is too difficult to negotiate or implement.18 We find this 
answer unsatisfactory. True, there is no multilateral institution 
capable of imposing a broad-based tax on an international ba-
sis. But by the same token, there are no international courts 
capable of enforcing IP law against private actors in different 
countries, and yet nation-states nonetheless have been able to 
set up a global IP system. The transaction costs of negotiating a 
global R&D treaty would be significant—and the subsequent 
monitoring and enforcement costs even more so—but the same 
can be said of any comprehensive international IP accord. And 
even if non-IP mechanisms would entail higher administrative 
costs, that still leaves the question of whether that administra-
tive cost difference would exceed the greater deadweight loss of 
proprietary pricing in an IP regime. 
The previous paragraph assumes that deadweight loss in 
an IP system exceeds deadweight loss under a non-IP alterna-
tive. That assumption is the basis for the conventional critique 
of IP. While the assumption may be credible in the domestic IP 
context,19 the same assumption cannot be extended to the in-
 
 16. See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for 
Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIO. 147 (2004) (describing a proposed 
framework wherein countries directly contribute to healthcare R&D). 
 17. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 
BRIT. MED. J. 1279 (2006). 
 18. See, e.g., Thomas Alured Faunce & Hitoshi Nasu, Three Proposals for 
Rewarding Novel Health Technologies Benefiting People Living in Poverty. A 
Comparative Analysis of Prize Funds, Health Impact Funds and a Cost-
Effectiveness/Competitive Tender Treaty, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 146, 149 
(2008) (discussing the challenges of implementing a global R&D treaty or prize 
fund); Rachel Kiddell-Monroe et al., Medical R&D Convention Derailed: Impli-
cations for the Global Health System, J. HEALTH DIPL., Aug. 2013, at 2, http:// 
www.ghd-net.org/abstracts/volume-1/2 (noting a breakdown in R&D treaty ne-
gotiations). 
 19. Even in the domestic context, nation-states can use IP as an innova-
tion incentive while allocating access to knowledge goods through mechanisms 
that generally avoid the deadweight loss associated with proprietary pricing. 
See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging In-
novation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998) (discussing patent buyouts as a means of 
reducing deadweight loss). In a project in progress, we further explore the pos-
sibility of pairing IP-based innovation incentives with access allocation mech-
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ternational setting. Proprietary pricing for knowledge goods re-
sults in substantial deadweight losses, but even the strongest 
international IP regime does not necessarily result in proprie-
tary pricing for knowledge goods at the domestic level. To be 
sure, the global IP regime establishes a structure for setting 
the size of the rewards that innovators can claim, and it re-
quires states to establish an IP system. But significantly, this 
structure does not dictate the way that states must incentivize 
knowledge production and allocate access to knowledge goods 
within their own borders; in this sense, IP is merely a default. 
On the supply side of the knowledge-goods equation, inter-
national IP law does not force states to adopt any one approach 
for incentivizing innovation. States still can use non-IP mecha-
nisms—prizes, grants, tax credits, and the like—to encourage 
the production of knowledge. International IP law enables na-
tion-states that subsidize the production of knowledge goods to 
seek compensation from consumers elsewhere who benefit from 
those goods, but—at least as a formal matter—international IP 
law still leaves states wide leeway with respect to internal in-
centive structures. For example, a nation-state can require 
prize claimants to relinquish their IP rights as a condition for 
receiving the prize—and the national government can then 
keep for itself future revenues from licensing the knowledge 
good abroad. Less directly but more commonly, nation-states 
can subsidize the domestic production of knowledge goods 
through non-IP mechanisms such as grants and credits and 
then collect a share of overseas profits through taxation of the 
domestic producer. Global IP law creates a framework for figur-
ing out how much State B must pay for knowledge goods gen-
erated in State A; it does not dictate the way that State A pro-
duces knowledge goods internally. 
On the allocation side, states can (and often do) choose 
non-price mechanisms—funded through broad-based taxa-
tion—to distribute knowledge goods at the domestic level. For 
instance, a nation-state that desires to distribute a patented 
pharmaceutical to its own citizens at marginal cost can pur-
chase a license from the patentee and pay for the license 
through broad-based taxation. Nation-states with single-payer 
health care systems generally follow a variant of this approach, 
respecting the pharmaceutical maker’s IP rights while avoiding 
 
anisms that do not rely on proprietary pricing. See generally Daniel J. Hemel 
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism (Aug. 7, 2016) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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domestic deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.20 And even in 
countries such as the United States without single-payer 
health care, purchases of patented pharmaceutical products are 
heavily subsidized by the government (e.g., through Medicare 
Part D, Medicaid, and various health care-related tax expendi-
tures). To the extent that states do allow for access allocation 
through the mechanism of price, that is only because states 
have not opted for non-price alternatives. 
The common thread connecting the production and alloca-
tion stories—and a point that IP scholars have overlooked until 
now—is that international IP law and domestic policy are sepa-
rable: nation-states that sign international IP treaties such as 
TRIPS are not locked into IP-based mechanisms for incentiviz-
ing innovation or allocating access to knowledge goods. Nation-
states can choose to encourage innovation through non-IP 
mechanisms, and they can decide to distribute knowledge goods 
to their citizens at no cost or a discounted price. Even though 
key features of IP law have been determined internationally, 
nation-states remain central players in the provision of 
knowledge goods. 
To be clear, we are not arguing that policymakers con-
sciously conceive of international IP in these terms. As scholars 
such as Susan Sell have documented, the industrialized-
country policymakers behind TRIPS were largely driven by pri-
vate corporate interests, and developing countries agreed to 
these minimum IP standards based on promises of favorable 
trade terms.21 But even if our account does not reflect the moti-
vations of policymakers, we believe that our account does de-
 
 20. See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. Note, however, that 
states will only have full autonomy to purchase IP rights and use alternative 
allocation mechanisms if they can be confident that their investments will not 
be dispersed to consumers in other countries through international resale 
markets. TRIPS does not currently dictate whether foreign sales exhaust do-
mestic IP rights. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 6. The Federal Circuit recently 
decided en banc to uphold the U.S. rule that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S. 
patent rights. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). As we explain in a separate essay, reversal of the 
current rule would undermine a key benefit of the current international sys-
tem. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The 
Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 17, 21–
22 (2016). 
 21. See SELL, supra note 15, at 96 (“In effect, twelve corporations made 
public law for the world.”); id. at 110 (“[D]eveloping countries received promis-
es of greatly expanded market access for their agricultural products and tex-
tiles in exchange for agreeing to offer greater IP protection.”). 
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scribe the function that international IP actually serves. Inter-
national IP sets a framework for transfers from knowledge con-
sumers to knowledge producers—and within this framework, 
international IP allows nation-states to choose non-IP mecha-
nisms on the incentive side and the allocation side, and to re-
coup some of the cross-border benefits of their non-IP invest-
ments.22 States that rely on IP at the domestic level are not 
forced to do so by international law. While states must estab-
lish an infrastructure of IP laws to comply with TRIPS, they 
are free to employ non-IP alternatives in addition to or instead 
of IP, whether or not they realize that they have this choice. 
We explain and extend this insight further, while consider-
ing a range of counterarguments and qualifications. The Article 
proceeds in four Parts. Part I presents a conventional economic 
narrative of international IP treaties as the solution to a global 
public goods problem (drawing heavily from the work of the 
late innovation economist Suzanne Scotchmer).23 In short, this 
account proceeds as follows: Knowledge is a global public good, 
so in the absence of global coordination such as IP treaties, na-
tion-states will rationally underinvest in its production (the 
“underinvestment hypothesis”). Coordination through IP trea-
ties at the international level leads to harmonization of innova-
tion policy at the domestic level, and thus excessive reliance on 
IP relative to non-IP incentives (the “harmonization hypothe-
sis”). And yet IP treaties are the only plausible means of inter-
national coordination due to the absence of a global public fi-
nance system to fund non-IP incentives such as R&D tax 
credits (the “uniqueness hypothesis”). We develop a formal eco-
nomic model to illustrate this account. 
Part II draws on international-political-economy scholar-
ship to show why the underinvestment hypothesis is an incom-
plete explanation of state behavior. The strength of the hypoth-
esis depends on the robustness of its two premises: that 
knowledge is a global public good and that states seek to max-
imize absolute gains. Neither of those premises is universal. 
Knowledge is often not a pure public good, and the extent to 
which it is a global public good depends on the dispersion of 
 
 22. Cf. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 145, 158 (Daniel M. Hausman 
ed., 3d ed. 2008) (“[U]nder a wide range of circumstances individual firms be-
have as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual 
Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415 (2004). 
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demand for the knowledge good and the strength of positive lo-
cal production externalities. Moreover, international-political-
economy scholars have presented a number of alternatives to 
the absolute-gains model that seem to explain at least some 
state investments in knowledge goods. These alternatives in-
clude a “realist” model focused on relative gains and national 
security, a “constructivist” model focused on the spread of be-
havioral norms, and a “public choice” model emphasizing the 
role of actors below the state that may use R&D-related policies 
as a way to extract rents. To be sure, our analysis does not im-
ply that the underinvestment hypothesis is categorically false. 
Rather, our analysis limits the underinvestment hypothesis’s 
scope—and thus focuses attention on areas in which interna-
tional coordination will be most essential to knowledge produc-
tion.24 
Part III is where international IP treaties enter the narra-
tive. Nation-states have chosen to use international IP laws as 
a means of addressing the underinvestment problem. The har-
monization hypothesis posits that coordination of IP at the in-
ternational level necessarily leads states to use IP at the do-
mestic level. In Part III, we challenge that view. We develop 
the claim that international and domestic innovation policy are 
separable. True, TRIPS and other international IP agreements 
require signatory states to establish copyright and patent sys-
tems that meet minimum standards. Moreover, international 
IP agreements obligate signatory states to treat citizens of oth-
er signatories at least as favorably as their own citizens. But 
these agreements still allow individual states to adopt alterna-
tive (non-IP) arrangements for both the provision and alloca-
tion of knowledge goods at the domestic level. Our analysis also 
adds a new insight to the contentious debate over the Bayh-
Dole Act and similar arrangements abroad, which allow grant 
recipients to patent their publicly funded inventions.25 We ex-
plain that Bayh-Dole regimes have the overlooked benefit of al-
lowing nation-states to internalize some of the foreign benefits 
of their non-IP investments in innovation, thereby increasing 
incentives for such investments in the first place.26 
 
 24. For example, given the differing public choice dynamics in the patent 
and copyright contexts, we think global underinvestment is far more likely to 
be a problem for technical rather than creative works. 
 25. See infra notes 170, 177–82 and accompanying text. 
 26. We discuss this theory in more detail in a separate article. Daniel J. 
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders (Aug. 19, 
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Part IV then critiques the uniqueness hypothesis—the 
claim that IP is the only mechanism for incentivizing innova-
tion that can be scaled to the global level. While it is true that 
there is no global public finance system, there is also no global 
court system for enforcing IP rights. To be sure, treaties such 
as TRIPS have set up institutions for resolving cross-border IP 
disputes, but one can imagine similar structures with respect to 
other innovation-incentive mechanisms. Rather than relying on 
the uniqueness hypothesis to justify the international IP re-
gime, we argue that the most compelling justification for IP 
treaties is that they give each state some freedom to choose the 
domestically optimal set of innovation incentives and allocation 
mechanisms while also ensuring that production costs will be 
shared among states in rough proportion to the benefits they 
derive from knowledge goods. Moreover, the international IP 
regime effectively caps the size of transfers from consumer na-
tion-states to producer nation-states: no state must pay for 
knowledge goods it does not use, and no state must pay more 
than the sum total of the benefits that accrue to its citizens. 
Counterintuitively, the strongest arguments in favor of the in-
ternational IP regime may rest on grounds of domestic auton-
omy and distributive justice27—the very grounds on which in-
ternational IP laws are commonly criticized.28 
 
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 27. This is not a defense of the current global distribution of the costs of 
knowledge goods; we would favor broadening the current TRIPS exemption for 
least-developed countries. But we think the current system sets a reasonable 
framework for transfers among wealthier countries, and it is not obvious that 
poor countries would fare better under a non-IP coordination system (indeed, 
they might fare much worse). 
 28. See, e.g., ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (describing the “access 
to knowledge movement” and various criticisms of international IP); MADHAVI 
SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 173–99 (2012) (criticizing the approach to patents put in place by 
TRIPS because it limits access to life-saving technological discoveries); Marga-
ret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2821, 2832 (2006) (“Over-reliance on utility-maximization ignores distri-
butional consequences.”); Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 51–57 
(2003) (discussing human rights concerns surrounding TRIPS); Amy 
Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Im-
plementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1571–
74 (2009) (stating that “[t]he most acute criticisms of the [international IP] 
trend have focused on the potential impact of TRIPS on health” and studying 
how practical considerations limit countries’ autonomy to make use of the flex-
ibilities built into TRIPS). 
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Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for 
the debate over domestic innovation incentives. A common con-
cern regarding non-IP incentives is that states that subsidize 
the production of knowledge goods through non-IP channels 
cannot claim partial compensation from other consumer states. 
For example, Suzanne Scotchmer described the efficiency gains 
from IP treaties while lamenting the result of “too much intel-
lectual property” relative to non-IP incentives.29 But as we 
show, nation-states that subsidize innovation through prizes, 
grants, and tax credits can internalize the benefits conferred 
upon foreign consumers to the same extent as states that rely 
on IP. The international IP regime—perhaps surprisingly—
serves as a mechanism through which nation-states can recoup 
some of the positive externalities that they generate through 
non-IP investments. Thus our (qualified) defense of the inter-
national IP regime is not an argument for reliance on IP at the 
domestic level. To the contrary, our observations regarding in-
ternational IP suggest that innovation policy possibilities at the 
domestic level are broader than is often believed. 
I.  IP TREATIES AS THE SOLUTION TO A GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS PROBLEM   
This Part sets forth a conventional economic account of IP 
treaties as the solution to a global public goods problem. We 
begin in Part I.A with the problem of producing knowledge on 
the global scale. Part I.B then describes the relative substituta-
bility of IP and non-IP innovation incentives from the perspec-
tive of a single nation-state. Part I.C explains how states have 
settled on IP treaties as a solution to this global public goods 
problem. Finally, Part I.D restates this account in a formal 
economic model. 
A. THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE: UNCOMPENSATED EXTERNALITIES 
AND FREE-RIDING 
As we explained in the Introduction, the same public-goods 
nature of knowledge goods that justifies state subsidies in the 
first place also implies that nation-states cannot solve the 
knowledge-goods problem on their own. Rational, self-
interested nation-states will subsidize knowledge production 
only up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal 
benefit to their own citizens, without accounting for the bene-
 
 29. Scotchmer, supra note 23. 
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fits of domestic knowledge production in other states. Thus, 
discussions of international IP law often begin with a similar 
story of externalities as the one that justifies domestic IP laws, 
except that it is states rather than private firms that fail to op-
timally invest in producing knowledge goods.30 
There are at least two distinct accounts of why global in-
vestment in knowledge goods will be suboptimal, and the two 
accounts are worth teasing apart (for reasons that will become 
apparent below).31 Under the first account, which we will refer 
to as the “free-rider problem,” each state strategically considers 
the likely actions of others in setting its own knowledge-good 
subsidies. As explained by economists Gene Grossman and Ed-
win Lai, in “a trading world with many countries, . . . allow[ing] 
others to provide the incentives for innovation . . . avoid[s] the 
deadweight losses in . . . home markets.”32 In other words, there 
are some global public goods for which the payoffs seem to pre-
sent a multi-player prisoners’ dilemma, with each nation-state 
having an incentive to free-ride on the production of that good 
 
 30. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTU-
AL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 93 (2007) (beginning the 
section on “Policies Underlying the International IPRs System” with Joseph 
Stiglitz’s argument that knowledge is a global public good); MARGO A. BAGLEY 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND POLICY 19, 21 (2013) (stating that 
the “dominant justification for strong global intellectual property rights” is 
based on efficient international trade, in that if “China winks at piracy of 
computer programs and compact discs” then “much less incentive exists to 
produce the product in the first place”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA 
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 97 (3d ed. 2012) (noting the conventional argument “that worldwide re-
search and development investment probably falls short of its socially optimal 
level, and that weak protection of intellectual property rights in developing 
countries aggravates this important problem,” but questioning whether “de-
veloping countries should pay the price for increased” IP protection). In the 
earliest (pre-TRIPS) extended economic treatment of international patent 
agreements, Edith Penrose noted that they are beneficial only to the extent 
they increase innovation, though she was skeptical at that time that foreign 
patents would provide much incentive to innovators. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 127–29 (1951). 
 31. See infra notes 226–32 and accompanying text. 
 32. Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650; see also Martin J. Adelman & 
Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510 (1996) 
(“[S]ince patents are territorial, some countries may decide that they can win 
by free-riding on the patented technology developed elsewhere without sub-
stantially slowing the march of technological development. In this way, their 
societies are advantaged, although if everybody adopted this strategy, societies 
worldwide would lose out as technological advancement slowed.”). 
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by other states.33 In such circumstances, Grossman and Lai 
conclude, “a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for 
private innovation.”34 
This is not to say that trade necessarily leads nation-states 
to invest less in knowledge production. While the possibility 
that knowledge goods will move across borders may give rise to 
the risk of free-riding, it also may increase the marginal benefit 
of additional investment in R&D. This is so even if producer 
states have no way to recapture the benefits from knowledge 
goods consumed elsewhere. Access to knowledge generated by 
Japanese researchers likely increases the productivity of U.S. 
researchers (and vice versa). When the United States decides 
whether to invest in a particular project, the movement of 
knowledge goods across borders has two countervailing effects. 
On the one hand, the payoff from such investment may be larg-
er when U.S. researchers can stand on the shoulders of giants 
elsewhere. On the other hand, the United States may have an 
incentive to step back and allow other countries to take the 
lead. 
The free-rider account is distinct from a second account of 
underinvestment in IP: the “uncompensated externalities prob-
lem.” This problem arises when each nation-state sets its sub-
sidies for knowledge-good provision independently and non-
strategically, but still fails to account for positive externalities 
generated by its own innovation effort. For example, the United 
States might invest in cancer research up to the point that the 
marginal benefits to U.S. cancer patients (present and future) 
equal the marginal costs, without considering the benefits to 
cancer patients in other countries as well. If the United States 
were to consider the benefits to patients abroad when deciding 
how much to invest in cancer research, then presumably the 
United States would invest more. Economist Suzanne 
Scotchmer emphasized that “uncompensated externalities 
abroad”—benefits to consumers in other countries from a 
state’s own knowledge production efforts—mean that states 
“have deficient incentives to invest, relative to what is effi-
 
 33. For the payoffs to resemble a prisoners’ dilemma, all that is necessary 
is that the cost to an individual country of producing the good is greater than 
the benefit to that country but less than the global benefit. See Prisoners’ Di-
lemma, 3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
1271–72 (R.J. Barry Jones ed., 2001). 
 34. Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650. 
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cient.”35 Similarly, in the legal literature, John Duffy has ar-
gued that the problem of uncompensated externalities “pro-
vide[s] a particularly powerful justification for transnational 
patent harmonization.”36 (As discussed further below, we think 
this account is largely accurate insofar as knowledge goods are 
global public goods and nation-states seek to maximize abso-
lute gains, though we also note the account’s limits.) 
Of course, both effects can occur simultaneously: a nation-
state may underinvest in the provision of a particular 
knowledge good both because it fails to account for external 
benefits and because it expects to free-ride off the provision of 
that knowledge good by its neighbor.37 But we think it is worth 
explicitly disentangling these accounts because they will apply 
in different situations, and they lend themselves to different so-
lutions.38 For now, however, the important point is that under 
the standard economic account, nation-states will underinvest 
in knowledge-good provision unless they can find some way to 
coordinate their efforts. 
B. CHOICES IN STATE SUPPORT FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
Introductory IP casebooks often begin by explaining that 
patent and copyright laws increase incentives for information 
production, and thus allow for more efficient provision of 
knowledge goods by the private sector.39 As IP scholars have 
 
 35. Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 420. 
 36. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 695 (2002). 
 37. Scholars of international IP sometimes mention both effects without 
distinguishing them. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The 
Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Pub-
lic Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 285 (2004) (mentioning uncompensated ex-
ternalities and the choice of countries to “logically free ride on foreign R&D” as 
part of the same “main reason” that “countries would tend to protect new 
technology and product development at a level that is lower than would be 
globally optimal”). 
 38. See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 39. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, 
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 18–20 (7th ed. 2012); ROBERT P. 
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
12 (6th ed. 2012) (describing the public-good nature of knowledge as a justifi-
cation for awarding IP rights has a long history); JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manu-
al of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 71 (John 
Bowring ed., 1843), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1922 (“He who has no hope 
that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that which one man 
has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the 
inventor would almost always be driven out of the market . . . .”). 
  
182 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:167 
 
realized, there are a number of caveats to this account. Most 
obviously, IP sacrifices static efficiency for dynamic efficiency. 
IP increases the production of knowledge goods by making 
them more excludable, thereby increasing dynamic efficiency, 
but this benefit comes at the cost of pricing nonrivalrous goods 
above their marginal cost of zero, which reduces static efficien-
cy.40 Information is also rarely a pure public good. Knowledge 
goods are often excludable even without IP,41 and many such 
goods will be provided without state action,42 particularly as the 
costs of production plummet in many industries.43 Furthermore, 
creating property rights in information is only one of many 
 
 40. See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Para-
digm? Product Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 
1849–50 (2014) (arguing that IP should thus be described as addressing only 
an “appropriability problem” rather than a “public goods problem”). A good is 
nonexcludable if no one can be excluded from its benefits, and it is 
nonrivalrous if its consumption by one user does not detract from its utility for 
other users (that is, there is zero marginal cost to consumption). See PAUL 
KRUGMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 279 (2d ed. 2010). If a good is 
nonexcludable but rival (e.g., common pool resources such as biodiversity), 
consumers can free-ride on anyone who does pay, leading to “inefficiently low 
production.” Id. at 280. If a good is nonrivalrous but excludable (e.g., pay-per-
view movies), private firms can profit by supplying it, but setting a price 
greater than zero leads to “inefficiently low consumption.” Id. 
 41. See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability 
and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1903 (2013). Although 
Kapczynski and Syed frame their discussion as a critique of patents, we see no 
a priori reason to believe that patents increase the variance in the fraction of 
social value that inventors can capture. In the absence of patents, inventors 
could still resort to secrecy, and patents can level the playing field between 
inventions that are easy to keep secret and those that are not. There is less 
variability in information’s nonrivalrousness, but some information may de-
crease in value with use. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefi-
nitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 487–88 (2003) (arguing 
that if anyone could use Mickey Mouse, “the value of the character might 
plummet” because the public would “rapidly tire of ” him and “his image would 
be blurred”); Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Re-
sistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 67 (2005) (describing antibiotic resistance, which seems to us a 
clear example of rival patentable knowledge). 
 42. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF 
ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) (describing industries 
in which innovation has flourished with relatively little state intervention); 
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 
(2007) (describing the social benefits of non-internalized spillovers). But there 
is little serious challenge to the claim that many knowledge goods will not be 
produced without some state-facilitated transfer to the producer, and our ar-
gument is focused on those cases. 
 43. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 99–106 
(2006) (describing the development of free software products). 
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ways to compensate providers of knowledge goods. Alternative-
ly, states can subsidize the production of knowledge goods 
through prizes, grants, and tax incentives (such as tax credits 
for R&D and special deductions for qualified artists).44 
In previous work, we have analyzed the advantages and 
disadvantages of these various mechanisms from the perspec-
tive of a single nation-state.45 We explained that no one incen-
tive (or mix of incentives) strictly dominates for all forms of 
knowledge production; rather, optimal innovation policy is con-
text specific. IP is particularly well suited to cases in which 
capital markets operate efficiently, potential innovators are 
risk-neutral, and the relevant knowledge good is considered a 
luxury. In all cases, the choice of innovation incentive will de-
pend on the nature of the knowledge goods in question and on 
the society’s goals and distributional preferences.46 
 
 44. Performing artists can claim a deduction for unreimbursed expenses 
even when they take the standard deduction, while employees in most other 
lines of work only can claim a deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses 
if they itemize deductions on their tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 45. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3. Although our prior work focused on 
incentives for patentable knowledge, our framework also applies to other 
knowledge goods such as artistic works, though the dimensions of our frame-
work suggest that optimal incentives will look very different for most creative 
works than for technical inventions. For an example of a tax incentive for cre-
ative works, see 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(2), which allows deductions for a “qualified 
performing artist.” For federal grant opportunities for artists, see Grants, 
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/grants (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2016). Governments also use tax incentives to support movie produc-
tion. See, e.g., Paul Krekorian, To Keep ‘Hollywood’ in Hollywood, Tax Incen-
tives Are Key, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op 
-ed/la-oe-krekorian-film-tax-credit-20140714-story.html; Etan Vlessing, Mark 
Wahlberg to Canada: Restore Film Tax Breaks for Hollywood, HOLLYWOOD 
REP. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/mark-wahlberg 
-canada-restore-film-398637; see also infra note 69 (noting other grants and 
tax incentives for the arts). 
 46. In short, we argued that every state transfer to spur knowledge pro-
duction embodies the answers to three questions: (1) Who decides the size of 
the transfer? Does the state tailor the reward on a project-by-project basis (as 
with direct spending and fixed prizes)? Or does it simply establish technology-
neutral ground rules (as with IP and tax incentives), which leverage private 
information about potential projects? (2) When does the transfer occur? Only 
ex post to successful projects (as with prizes and IP), providing a strong incen-
tive for success? Or are projects funded before their results are known (as with 
grants and tax incentives), which might be more effective when producers are 
risk averse and capital constrained? (3) Who pays? Do all taxpayers fund the 
transfer (as with grants, prizes, and tax incentives), or only users of the result-
ing information (as with IP)? We argue that whether “user pays” is normative-
ly attractive will vary with the technology, and that in theory, “user pays” 
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From the perspective of the state, one of the key distinc-
tions between IP and other knowledge-production incentives is 
that IP-mediated transfers to artists and innovators are for the 
most part not reflected in government budgets. The higher 
prices on IP-protected goods can be considered a “shadow” 
tax—equivalent to a targeted sales tax on these goods—and IP 
laws can be viewed as “shadow” expenditures that transfer the-
se rewards to producers.47 
The other mechanisms, in contrast, are funded through 
conventional public finance. From the consumer’s perspective, 
of course, there is little difference between paying $100 in 
higher prices on IP-protected products and paying $100 in 
higher taxes that are used to fund mechanisms such as prizes, 
grants, and tax credits.48 But the interchangeability of IP and 
other transfer mechanisms depends on the existence of a state 
that can use conventional public finance mechanisms. In the 
global context, there is no single worldwide governance body 
that has authority to impose taxes, and thus no straightfor-
ward way to replicate the effect of IP through a tax-and-spend 
regime. 
C. THE IP SOLUTION 
In theory, nation-states could address the problem of un-
derinvestment in knowledge goods by coordinating on any of 
the mechanisms discussed in Part I.B. In practice, however, IP 
has emerged as the primary solution to this global coordination 
dilemma. In the conventional economic account, treaties such 
as TRIPS help solve the underprovision problem by requiring 
states to bear the costs of knowledge production to the extent 
that they use knowledge goods produced under IP laws. 
Efforts at multilateral coordination on IP date to the 
1880s, when numerous nations negotiated the Berne Conven-
tion on copyright law and the Paris Convention on patent and 
trademark law, which are administered by an organization now 
 
could be incorporated into other reward mechanisms. Hemel & Ouellette, su-
pra note 3, at 327–52. 
 47. Id. at 312–13, 371–73. 
 48. As currently implemented, non-IP incentives tend to be funded 
through broad-based taxation in which users cross-subsidize each others’ 
knowledge goods, but as we’ve explained, this is a distinct third dimension in 
innovation policy space. Id. at 327–52. The administrative costs of each system 
also will vary with implementation; for estimates of current costs in the Unit-
ed States see id. at 361–67. 
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known as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).49 These agreements required some minimum level of 
IP protection (e.g., the Berne Convention set a minimum copy-
right term of life-of-the-author plus fifty years),50 and they es-
tablished the norm of “national treatment”—that every mem-
ber must give nationals of other members treatment no less 
favorable than their own.51 As Graeme Dinwoodie notes, “This 
basic structure—national treatment plus substantive minima—
has persisted throughout the twentieth century,” with the min-
imum IP standards gradually being “revised upwards” from 
their initially “undemanding” levels.52 
The most significant upward revision came when TRIPS 
was negotiated in 1994 through the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).53 The heightened standards of TRIPS must be met by 
every WTO member nation, which now includes most of the 
world (including every high-income country).54 For example, 
TRIPS requires countries to offer twenty-year patents “in all 
fields of technology” and to have trade secret laws that protect 
certain “undisclosed information.”55 More recently, countries in-
cluding the United States have pushed for further increases in 
global IP protection through bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments, including the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), signed in 2011 (but then rejected by the European Par-
liament), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), on which 
participants reached agreement in October 2015 after conten-
 
 49. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (revised July 24, 1971), S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 303 (revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]; see 
WIPO—A Brief History, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ 
about-wipo/en/history.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 50. Berne Convention, supra note 49, art. 7(1). 
 51. Id. at art. 5(1); Paris Convention, supra note 49, art. 2(1). 
 52. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectu-
al Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 995 (2002). 
 53. TRIPS, supra note 14. For an account of how nation-states jockey for 
favorable forums for IP treaty negotiations—and an important reminder of 
how messily economic theories play out in the real world—see Laurence R. 
Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
 54. See Members and Observers, supra note 14. 
 55. TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 27(1), 33, 39. For an overview of other 
changes, see J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual 
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 
INT’L L. 345 (1995). 
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tious negotiations (but which may still fail during ratifica-
tion).56 
To be sure, not all scholars agree that the upward ratchet-
ing of IP protection under TRIPS and other agreements has 
been a positive development. TRIPS has been criticized for im-
peding access to knowledge and development,57 for having been 
unfairly imposed on developing countries,58 and for limiting pol-
icy experimentation and regulatory competition.59 Some com-
mentators have argued that TRIPS should be supplemented or 
replaced by different global R&D agreements. For example, Jo-
seph Stiglitz has argued that “basic research and many other 
fundamental forms of knowledge are not, and almost certainly 
should not be, protected by an intellectual property regime,” 
and therefore “[i]n these areas efficiency requires public sup-
port,” which “must be at the global level.”60 There have also 
been calls for supplemental R&D treaties in the public health61 
 
 56. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shift-
ing, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011). 
 57. See Kapczynski, supra note 28, at 1571–72. 
 58. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 15, at 9–10; Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and 
Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or a Small Step Forward?, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 199–200. 
 59. See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A 
NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 115 (2012); Duffy, supra note 36, at 721; Li-
sa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 86 
(2015). 
 60. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 320 
(Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999). 
 61. Tim Hubbard and James Love advocate an “R&D contribution norm, 
established by treaty.” Hubbard & Love, supra note 16, at 150. Under the 
Health Impact Fund proposed by Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers could opt in to a global prize scheme, for which they pro-
pose a minimum funding level of $6 billion (allocated based on gross national 
income). AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAK-
ING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 44 (2008), http://www 
.healthimpactfund.org/Old/hif_book.pdf. For similar arguments in favor of a 
global health R&D treaty, see Nicoletta Dentico & Nathan Ford, The Courage 
To Change the Rules: A Proposal for an Essential Health R&D Treaty, PLOS 
MED., Feb. 2005, at 96; Suerie Moon et al., Innovation and Access to Medicines 
for Neglected Populations: Could a Treaty Address a Broken Pharmaceutical 
R&D System?, PLOS MED., May 2012, at 1. Movement toward a global health 
R&D treaty at the World Health Organization has been unsuccessful. See 
CONSULTATIVE EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON RESEARCH & DEV., WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL FINANCING AND COORDINATION (2012), 
http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf (recommending a 
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and climate62 arenas. But these critiques generally do not chal-
lenge the dominant narrative that international coordination is 
necessary; rather, they argue for non-IP forms of collective ac-
tion. Stiglitz is clear, for instance, that “[k]nowledge is a global 
public good” and that “global public goods provide a central ra-
tionale for international collective action.”63 
Despite these critiques of TRIPS and calls for global R&D 
treaties, IP might seem like the most natural solution to the 
collective-action problem facing nation-states because there is 
no world government that can set global taxes to support con-
ventional public finance mechanisms. Scotchmer argued that 
states coordinate on IP due to the lack of “institutions to har-
monize public spending.”64 She elaborated that “[t]here is no 
analogous institution [to IP treaties] for making public spon-
sors account for cross-border spillovers.”65 
Scotchmer was not, however, pleased with what she saw as 
the inevitable implication of this necessary global coordination 
on IP, which she summarized as follows: 
[H]armonization [of global IP laws] will not solve all the efficiency 
problems that arise from independent policy making. Perhaps the 
most important problem arises when we recognize that for some in-
vestments, public spending is the most efficient way to fund R&D. . . . 
But since public funding agencies will not be inclined to take account 
of benefits generated abroad, the incentives to provide public spend-
ing will be deficient. In contrast, harmonized intellectual property 
protections allow countries to recoup some of the benefits they confer 
on foreign consumers. This may lead to an international system that 
relies more heavily on intellectual property than is efficient, especial-
ly when it is recognized that public spending on R&D is an extensive 
and efficient practice.66 
In sum, the account of global IP treaties presented above 
proceeds as follows: Knowledge is a global public good, so na-
tion-states will rationally underinvest in its production unless 
there is coordination at the global level (which we refer to as 
the “underinvestment hypothesis”). Global coordination on IP 
 
binding instrument for health R&D funding); Kiddell-Monroe et al., supra note 
18 (describing the derailment of this process). 
 62. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough” Technol-
ogies, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 25 (2006); Daniel Bodansky, Climate Commit-
ments: Assessing the Options, in BEYOND KYOTO 37, 43 (Joseph E. Aldy et al. 
eds., 2003); Heleen de Coninck et al., International Technology-Oriented 
Agreements To Address Climate Change, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 335, 348 (2008). 
 63. Stiglitz, supra note 60, at 320. 
 64. Scotchmer, supra note 23. 
 65. Id. at 420. 
 66. Id. at 436. 
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dictates how states incentivize innovation and allocate 
knowledge goods domestically, leading to reliance on IP at the 
expense of other mechanisms such as prizes, grants, and tax 
credits (the “harmonization hypothesis”). And IP is the only 
plausible solution for this collective-action problem due to the 
lack of a global public finance system to support other mecha-
nisms such as grants, prizes, and tax incentives (the “unique-
ness hypothesis”). 
In the following three Parts, we argue that each step of 
this logic is incomplete. But first, we restate the classical eco-
nomic account in formal terms so that each step in the logic can 
be rendered more precise. 
D. A FORMAL ECONOMIC MODEL 
We begin with a rudimentary model featuring some num-
ber of states—SA, SB, SC, and so on—each of which is a potential 
producer and potential consumer of knowledge goods. Let x be 
the level of investment in production of the relevant knowledge 
good. Let BA(x) be the benefit to consumers in SA from invest-
ment of x in the relevant good assuming that the good is freely 
available to consumers in SA; let BB(x) be the benefit to consum-
ers in SB from investment of x in the good (again assuming free 
availability), and so on, such that Bglobal is the sum of all Bs for 
all nation-states. Finally, let C(x) represent the cost of invest-
ing x. Assume that investment in the production of the 
knowledge good is subject to the law of diminishing marginal 
returns, such that B′(x) > 0 and B″(x) < 0. 
From a global welfare perspective, the optimal level of in-
vestment (xglobal*) occurs when Bglobal′(xglobal*) = C′(xglobal*), which is 
when the marginal benefit from any additional investment 
equals the marginal cost. However, SA only has an incentive to 
invest up to xA* such that BA′(xA*) = C′(xA*). If BA < Bglobal, then 
xA* < xglobal*. SA may even invest less than xA* if it suspects that 
it can rely on investments by other countries, but if BA is the 
largest Bi, no individual country will have an incentive to in-
crease total global investment beyond xA*. Total global invest-
ment will thus be below the global optimum. 
States can address this inefficiency by establishing a 
mechanism whereby consumer states will compensate SA when 
a knowledge good produced in SA is consumed elsewhere. So, for 
example, if diabetes patients in SB benefit from a good generat-
ed in SA, the patients or the government of SB will make a pay-
ment to an SA-based firm. (The payment will go directly to the 
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government of SA if the relevant patent is state-owned; other-
wise, the government of SA will claim a portion of the payment 
through taxation of the firm.) Let TBA represent the transfer 
payment that SB (or its citizens) makes to SA (or an SA-based 
firm) as partial compensation to SA for developing the relevant 
knowledge good. 
The international IP regime serves as a mechanism for set-
ting TBA. If a knowledge good is produced in SA and demand for 
the good exists among SB’s citizens, SB cannot simply appropri-
ate the knowledge good for its own use; it must compensate SA. 
In the absence of a licensing agreement, SB must allow SA to sell 
the knowledge good to consumers in SB at a monopoly price (the 
monopoly being conferred by IP law). Let PB|monopoly be the profits 
that SA (or the SA-based firm) will earn from selling the 
knowledge good at a monopoly price in SB, and let BB|monopoly(x) be 
the benefit to consumers in SB from access to the good at a mo-
nopoly price. Absent perfect price discrimination, some con-
sumers in SB who could benefit from the good will be unwilling 
or unable to pay the monopoly price; thus, BB|monopoly(x) < BB(x), 
and TBA = PB|monopoly < BB|monopoly(x). If the SA-based firm can price-
discriminate perfectly, then TBA = PB|monopoly = BB|monopoly(x) = 
BB(x). 
We return to this model below. But before doing so, we in-
terrogate key assumptions underlying the model—namely, that 
states are rational actors and that knowledge goods are global 
public goods. 
II.  WHY DO NATION-STATES INVEST IN KNOWLEDGE 
PRODUCTION?   
The public-goods framework presented in Part I predicts 
that without an international coordination mechanism, nation-
states will underinvest in knowledge goods. Testing this predic-
tion is virtually impossible: to say that states “underinvest” in 
knowledge goods, we would have to know the optimal amount 
of public investment in knowledge goods. That amount is, of 
course, unknown (and likely unknowable). Moreover, the un-
derinvestment hypothesis generated by the public-goods 
framework is not falsified by the fact that states do invest in 
information production beyond what international agreements 
require; after all, the public-goods framework predicts underin-
vestment rather than no investment. 
We can observe that in practice, there are tremendous 
state transfers to information producers beyond what is re-
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quired by international law. In 2010, for instance, the govern-
ments of seven countries—the United States, France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, China, Japan, and South Korea—spent 
more than $272 billion in the aggregate on direct R&D support 
(not including tax incentives).67 This direct support for R&D 
comes on top of the indirect subsidy for R&D required by inter-
national IP law. Indeed, direct U.S. government support for 
R&D quite likely exceeds the size of the patent “shadow tax” in 
the United States.68 Governments also spend significant sums 
to encourage creative works.69 Again, this does not disprove the 
underinvestment hypothesis, but it may cause one to question 
whether the conventional economic account fully captures the 
reasons why states invest in innovation. 
Recall that the underinvestment hypothesis rests on two 
premises: (1) knowledge is a global public good; and (2) nation-
states rationally underinvest in global public goods. While we 
cannot test the underinvestment hypothesis by comparing ac-
tual investment to optimal investment (because we cannot de-
termine the latter figure), we can evaluate the robustness of 
 
 67. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2014 
app. at tbl.4-14, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/content/chapter-4/at04 
-14.pdf. 
 68. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 320–21, 322–25, 371–72 (not-
ing as of 2013 that the federal government spends in the range of $140–$150 
billion per year on R&D and R&D-related tax incentives, more than double the 
estimated amount of domestically earned corporate income from patents and 
trade secrets). 
 69. In the mid-1990s, direct public expenditure on the arts in the United 
States was about $1.5 billion per year, which was substantially less per capita 
than in many other industrialized nations: Germany spent $6.9 billion, France 
spent $3.3 billion, the United Kingdom spent $1.5 billion, and Canada spent 
$1.3 billion. See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, INTERNATIONAL DATA ON 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON THE ARTS 9, tbl.1 (Jan. 2000) http://www.arts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/74.pdf. Classifying “the arts” is difficult; these estimates did 
not include spending on libraries, arts training, capital expenditures (e.g., 
building a new theater), or tax incentives. Id. at 2. Lea Shaver notes that pub-
lic support for book provision includes support for universities that employ 
and train many authors, direct purchase of textbooks by education depart-
ments (or by students using public financial aid), and purchases of books by 
libraries—which alone costs taxpayers a billion dollars per year in the United 
States. Lea Shaver, The Right To Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 51 
(2015). Cultural production is also supported through tax incentives. See 
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS 
18–24 (3d ed. 2012), http://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/how-the-us-funds 
-the-arts.pdf; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing addi-
tional tax incentives). 
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the premises on which the hypothesis rests. We do so in this 
Part. 
We have already noted that knowledge is rarely a pure 
public good.70 In Part II.A, we consider the extent to which 
knowledge is in fact a global public good. We suggest that 
“globalness” is a matter of degree: while demand for some 
knowledge goods is dispersed across countries, demand for oth-
er knowledge goods is highly concentrated in one or a small 
number of locations. We also consider evidence that the produc-
tion of knowledge goods yields positive local production exter-
nalities: in this respect, knowledge production is an activity 
that generates distinct local and global benefits. We argue that 
the strength of the underinvestment hypothesis varies with the 
dispersion of demand and the magnitude of positive local pro-
duction externalities: when demand is highly concentrated and 
positive local production externalities are significant, nation-
states will rationally invest in knowledge production at close to 
globally optimal levels. 
In Part II.B, we examine the second premise on which the 
underinvestment hypothesis rests: the claim that nation-
states—as self-interested rational actors—will underinvest in 
the production of global public goods. For decades, scholars of 
domestic and political economy have debated whether nation-
states are in fact self-interested rational actors. One variant of 
the rational-actor model, “realism,” posits that nation-states 
are engaged in a competition with each other for security, and 
that they seek to maximize relative (rather than absolute) 
gains. Realism is especially helpful for understanding state 
spending on knowledge goods related to national-security con-
cerns (such as the substantial spending on the space race), but 
the realist approach also suggests that states may have incen-
tives to invest in knowledge goods with no immediate defense 
application. An alternative to the rational-actor model, “con-
structivism,” sees states as actors whose identities and inter-
ests are constructed by social interactions. In the constructivist 
model, states do not single-mindedly seek material gains; ra-
ther, their actions are shaped by behavioral norms, such as the 
norm that spending on science is something that states are 
“supposed to do.” Finally, public choice theory (along with its 
international-political-economy cousin, “liberal intergovernme-
ntalism”) focuses on actors below the state, such as domestic in-
 
 70. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
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terest groups that may seek to extract rents through R&D-
related policies. 
Unsurprisingly, these different perspectives yield different 
conclusions as to why states invest in knowledge production—
and different predictions as to whether investment will ap-
proach optimal levels. However, they all suggest that the con-
ventional account in the IP literature overlooks important di-
mensions of the knowledge-production problem. This is not to 
imply that international IP treaties are unnecessary; rather, 
our analysis of the underinvestment hypothesis is aimed at 
identifying the conditions under which the conventional eco-
nomic account will be most applicable. 
A. IS KNOWLEDGE A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD? 
As noted above, the underinvestment hypothesis proceeds 
from the premise that knowledge is a global public good. A 
global public good, like other public goods, is nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable.71 The distinguishing feature of a global public 
good is that its benefits transcend national borders. IP scholars 
often state categorically that information and knowledge are 
global public goods.72 In this Section, we examine the extent to 
which benefits from knowledge goods—benefits from consump-
tion and from positive production externalities—are in fact 
global. 
1. Dispersion of Demand 
For some knowledge goods, demand is largely domestic. 
And with respect to these goods, the coordination challenges 
outlined in Part I are less daunting. Consider the cranberry. 
Over three-quarters of the world’s cranberries are grown in the 
United States,73 and nearly three-quarters of U.S.-grown cran-
 
 71. See KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 40. 
 72. See, e.g., Dana Dalrymple, Scientific Knowledge as a Global Public 
Good: Contributions to Innovation and the Economy, in THE ROLE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 35, 36 
(2003); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 
156 (“[R]ecent scholarship in economics and law . . . identifies knowledge as a 
global public good . . . .”); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1714 (2008) (“[K]nowledge is a global 
public good . . . .”). 
 73. See FAOStat, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http:// 
faostat3.fao.org/browse/Q/QC/E (select “Cranberries”) (last visited Oct. 13, 
2016). 
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berries are consumed domestically.74 So questions related to the 
health effects of cranberries are primarily of concern to U.S. 
producers and consumers—other countries that don’t produce 
or consume cranberries in significant quantities have much less 
interest in the issue.75 Unsurprisingly, the United States is the 
only country that has invested significantly in cranberry-
related R&D: the U.S. National Institutes of Health has target-
ed cranberry-related research as a funding priority since 2005.76 
Cranberry-related knowledge appears to be nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable (so technically a public good); but with only the 
United States (and, to a lesser extent, Canada) having a signif-
icant stake in the issue, cranberry-related R&D does not pose a 
major international coordination challenge.77 
Other examples are not hard to come by. Roughly three-
quarters of the world’s tornados occur in the United States,78 so 
lack of international coordination with respect to tornado-
related R&D is probably not a significant problem (even though 
tornado-related knowledge probably is nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable). Moyamoya disease occurs primarily in the 
Japanese population—Japan has over fifty times as many cases 
as the rest of the world combined79—so it is unlikely that global 
coordination challenges will lead the Japanese government to 
underinvest in Moyamoya-disease-related research. Indeed, 
 
 74. See Tom Moroney & Brian K. Sullivan, U.S. Cranberry Growers Give 
Thanks as Sales Rise in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2006/11/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-berry.3633021.html. 
 75. To be sure, if it turns out that cranberries have a large positive health 
effect such as curing cancer, then they might be more widely consumed. See 
generally SUSAN PLAYFAIR, AMERICA’S FOUNDING FRUIT: THE CRANBERRY IN A 
NEW ENVIRONMENT 14–16 (2014) (describing research on cranberries’ cancer-
fighting properties). 
 76. See Programs and Projects, UMASS DARTMOUTH CRANBERRY HEALTH 
RESEARCH CTR., http://www.umassd.edu/chrc/programsampprojects (last visit-
ed Oct. 13, 2016). 
 77. This does not mean that cranberries will have no economic effects out-
side the United States; foreign firms may choose to invest in the U.S. agricul-
tural industry, perhaps at the encouragement of the U.S. government. Our 
point is simply that if demand for a knowledge good is geographically concen-
trated in one country, then the good does not present the same problem of un-
compensated externalities discussed above. 
 78. See Kathryn Prociv, From Domestic to International: Tornadoes 
Around the World, U.S. TORNADOES (July 25, 2013), http://www.ustornadoes 
.com/2013/07/25/from-domestic-to-international-tornadoes-around-the-world. 
 79. See Yoshiharu Matshushima, Moyamoya Disease, in PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY 1053, 1053 (A. Leland Albright et al. 
eds., 1999). 
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knowledge goods of this type (we will call them “cranberry 
goods”) might be the modal case. Most patent applicants only 
seek to patent in a single jurisdiction; for example, patent filing 
data suggests that about two-thirds of USPTO applications are 
only filed in the United States.80 And even when the benefits of 
knowledge production are not as limited geographically, there 
are some challenges that are so important to a single country 
that the country’s government is likely to take on the challenge 
itself rather than free-riding off the efforts of others (e.g., flood 
control in the Netherlands).81 
Certain creative works may resemble the “cranberry good” 
prototype to an even greater degree. More than ninety-six per-
cent of Swedish speakers live in Sweden,82 so one might expect 
the government of Sweden to have an incentive to invest close 
to xglobal* in Swedish-language literature and lyrical music. (To 
be sure, some Swedish-language books and songs may reach a 
much wider audience via translation, as Stieg Larsson and 
ᗅᗺᗷᗅ can attest.) The United Kingdom may have entirely ad-
equate incentives to invest in the production of new recipes for 
steak and kidney pie83 (though perhaps the case for global coor-
dination is stronger with respect to the production of crime 
dramas starring Benedict Cumberbatch). 
And for some creative works, the public goods framework is 
almost entirely inapplicable because the relevant knowledge is 
inextricably tied to a rivalrous and excludable good. (No two 
individuals can have the same original Jeff Koons balloon dog 
 
 80. See IP5 STATISTICS REPORT: 2014 EDITION 49 tbl.3 (2015), http://www 
.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/ip5sr2014.pdf (report-
ing that roughly sixty-six percent of U.S. applicants with a 2010 priority filing 
year did not file elsewhere, compared with fifty-seven percent for the Europe-
an Patent Office, seventy-two percent for Japan, ninety-six percent for China, 
eighty-three percent for applicants in South Korea, and seventy-seven percent 
for applicants elsewhere). These figures might be explained in large part by 
the high cost of foreign filing and enforcement rather than the geographic con-
centration of demand. See MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF 
TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 35 (2012) (explaining why “obtaining parallel 
patents is . . . difficult and costly” and only feasible for large companies). 
 81. See Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a Flood-Prone Land, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/europe/ 
netherlands-sets-model-of-flood-prevention.html (discussing Dutch preemi-
nence in flood-related research). 
 82. See Swedish, ETHNOLOGUE, http://www.ethnologue.com/language/swe 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 83. See, e.g., Anthony Worall Thompson, Steak and Kidney Pie, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/food/recipes/steakandkidneypie_73308 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016). 
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sculpture in their living room—unless they share a living 
room.)84 
Global coordination is more essential with respect to 
knowledge goods for which demand is widely dispersed—think 
of information about earthquake dynamics or wind energy. In 
terms of rivalrousness and excludability, knowledge in these 
fields may be no different from knowledge about the treatment 
of Moyamoya disease and the tracking of tornados. But free-
riding incentives are much stronger. The United States knows 
that it can rely on the results of earthquake-related research 
from Japan and wind-energy research from Germany. And Ja-
pan and Germany face a similar incentive structure. Moreover, 
even without opportunistic free-riding, the problem of uncom-
pensated externalities remains. The United States will ration-
ally invest in knowledge production up to the point that the 
marginal benefits (to the U.S.) equal the marginal costs, but 
the marginal benefits to the United States of wind energy-
related knowledge represent only a fraction of the marginal 
global benefits; accordingly, the United States will set its in-
vestment level below the point at which marginal global bene-
fits equal costs (and other countries will do the same).85 
Based on a rational-actor model of state behavior, then, 
aggregate global investment in R&D will be closer to the social-
ly optimal level with respect to knowledge goods for which de-
mand is concentrated in one or a small number of industrial-
ized nations. (When the demand for goods is localized only to 
developing countries that cannot afford to produce the goods, 
local knowledge goods may prove more difficult to finance than 
global knowledge goods.)86 If the benefits of a knowledge good 
 
 84. See Katya Kazakina and Philip Boroff, Koons’s Puppy Sets $58 Million 
Record for Living Artist, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2013-11-13/koons-s-puppy-sets-58-million-record-for-living 
-artist. 
 85. It is important to distinguish between knowledge goods that are pri-
marily enjoyed in a single country (e.g., cranberry-related research) and the 
“local public goods” of Tieboutian theory. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure The-
ory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (mentioning 
beaches, parks, municipal golf courses, police protection, roads, and parking 
facilities as examples of local public goods). Residents of other nations are in 
no way excluded (by law or by distance) from enjoying the benefits of local 
knowledge goods. What makes a knowledge good “local” is that demand is geo-
graphically concentrated. 
 86. See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 89 (2004). For ex-
ample, R&D on neglected diseases that primarily affect populations with low 
purchasing power is less likely to be funded than R&D on diseases that also 
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are localized, the government of a single country (or a small set 
of countries) will likely have an incentive to invest in R&D at or 
near the socially optimal level. If demand is dispersed, the 
marginal benefit of R&D investment for any one country is only 
a fraction of the marginal global benefit, and the free-rider 
problem is more severe. 
2. Local Production Externalities 
Even where demand for information is dispersed, the prob-
lem of producing global knowledge goods may be mitigated by 
the presence of positive local production externalities. Local 
production externalities arise when a nearby third party is af-
fected (positively or negatively) by the production of a good or 
service and when the third party neither charges nor pays the 
producer commensurately. For example, a slaughterhouse 
might impose a negative production externality on its neigh-
bors, while a bakery might impose a positive local production 
externality (the smell of fresh bread).87 
Knowledge generation may result in positive local produc-
tion externalities as well.88 California’s Silicon Valley serves as 
an illustration. Early firms in the area attracted workers with 
skills relevant to the semiconductor industry, providing a pool 
of potential employees with industry-specific knowledge for fu-
ture ventures.89 The early firms also attracted investors to Sili-
con Valley, leading to the growth of the venture capital sector.90 
These factors meant that by the late 1960s, the cost of produc-
ing semiconductor-related knowledge goods was lower in Sili-
con Valley than elsewhere. Thus, the cost to Intel of developing 
 
affect the wealthiest countries, even when the neglected diseases have a high-
er human cost. 
 87. See, e.g., Nicolas Guéguen, The Sweet Smell of . . . Implicit Helping: 
Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Spontaneous Help in Shopping 
Malls, 152 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397 (2012) (finding correlation between pleasant 
smells and altruism). 
 88. For an argument that sub-national governments can internalize many 
of the benefits of their public spending on innovation, see Camilla Alexandra 
Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2670400. 
 89. See David P. Angel, High-Technology Agglomeration and the Labor 
Market: The Case of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE 
ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 124, 130 (Martin Kenney ed., 
2000). 
 90. See Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, Venture Capital in Silicon Val-
ley: Fueling New Firm Formation, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra 
note 89, at 98, 107–09. 
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a four-bit central processing unit circa 1971 was likely lower in 
northern California than it would have been in, say, North Da-
kota; Intel had access to skilled workers who had acquired in-
dustry-specific knowledge at other firms, as well as access to 
potential sources of capital. In this way, efforts by the early 
firms in Silicon Valley (e.g., Hewlett-Packard and Fairchild 
Semiconductor) yielded positive local production externalities 
from which subsequent entrants (e.g., Intel and Apple) benefit-
ted.91 
Putting this into the public-goods framework, one might 
say that semiconductor-related research in Silicon Valley in the 
1960s yielded benefits with different degrees of globalness. The 
microprocessor is certainly not a cranberry-type good: demand 
is widely dispersed.92 On the other hand, the positive produc-
tion externalities of semiconductor-related research were geo-
graphically concentrated: firms in Silicon Valley could benefit 
from improved access to skilled labor, knowhow, and capital in 
ways that firms in Switzerland could not. In other words, Sili-
con Valley firms had geographically sticky complementary as-
sets that made investments in knowledge about, say, new semi-
conductor architectures far more valuable in that 
geographically concentrated region than outside it, regardless 
of whether the knowledge was free for other regions to copy. 
The story of Silicon Valley is (largely)93 a story of positive 
local production externalities generated by private activity, but 
public R&D spending can likewise lead to positive local produc-
tion externalities.94 Consider the case of Huntsville, Alabama, 
 
 91. On positive local production externalities, see generally Paul 
Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 
(1991). 
 92. This was not always the case. In the 1970s, Tim Berners-Lee tried to 
sell circuit boards with early microprocessors in Oxford (before later going on 
to invent the World Wide Web), but he was not as successful as Steve Jobs and 
Steve Wozniak were with a similar endeavor in Silicon Valley partly because 
Oxford did not have the demand supplied by Silicon Valley computer hobbyist 
groups. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 407 (2014). Other knowledge 
goods may similarly shift from cranberry-type goods to more global public 
goods over time. 
 93. While most accounts of Silicon Valley’s success have focused on indi-
vidual entrepreneurs, public funds also played a key role. See NAT’L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR COM-
PUTING RESEARCH (1999) (discussing the role of government funding in the 
computer revolution); Stuart W. Leslie, The Biggest “Angel” of Them All: The 
Military and the Making of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VAL-
LEY, supra note 89, at 48, 50. 
 94. See, e.g., Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, The Emergence of Israel’s 
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home to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center since 1960. The 
NASA center has attracted thousands of physicists, engineers, 
and other highly skilled workers to Huntsville; by one measure, 
Huntsville ranks second in the nation in the number of high-
tech workers per capita (behind only Silicon Valley).95 Several 
former NASA employees have gone on to found startups of their 
own; these new ventures benefit from access to Huntsville’s 
highly skilled labor pool and close connections with basic re-
searchers at NASA.96 Larger companies that value proximity to 
U.S. military and NASA facilities (including Boeing, Northrop 
Grumman, and Lockheed Martin) have established substantial 
presences in the Huntsville area as well.97 Some of the 
knowledge generated by research at the Marshall Space Flight 
Center meets the definition of a global public good: the Hubble 
Space Telescope is perhaps the most prominent example of a 
project pursued at Marshall that has yielded benefits for re-
searchers worldwide. At the same time, many of the economic 
benefits of R&D spending at Marshall are concentrated in the 
surrounding area.98 
Some argue that the incentive to attract mobile capital 
may lead jurisdictions to invest in knowledge goods at levels 
above the social optimum. For instance, Israel may lure Intel to 
set up a new facility south of Tel Aviv by offering tax incen-
 
Venture Capital Industry: How Policy Can Influence High-Tech Cluster Dy-
namics, in CLUSTER GENESIS: TECHNOLOGY-BASED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOP-
MENT 172 (Pontus Braunerhjelm & Maryann Feldman eds., 2006); Martha 
Prevezer & Han Tang, Policy-Induced Clusters: The Genesis of Biotechnology 
Clustering on the East Coast of China, in CLUSTER GENESIS, supra, at 113. 
 95. See TECHAMERICA FOUND., CYBERCITIES 2010: THE DEFINITIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY IN THE NATION’S TOP 60 CIT-
IES 8 (2010). 
 96. See, e.g., NASA, NASA’S IMPACT IN ALABAMA: A TECH TRANSFER PER-
SPECTIVE (2012), https://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/economic-impacts/ 
Alabama_NASA-Economic-Impacts.pdf. 
 97. See Leading Employers Huntsville/Madison County, CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE OF HUNTSVILLE/MADISON CNTY., http://www.huntsvillealabama 
usa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194&Itemid=355 
(last updated June 2016). 
 98. Similarly, public investments in technology infrastructure—such as 
the U.S. broadband sales tax exemption or direct funding of the U.S. National 
Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network—provide benefits to local industry 
that are difficult for other jurisdictions to appropriate. See Hemel & Ouellette, 
supra note 3, at 332 & n.140; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Nanotechnology and 
Innovation Policy, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 33, 69 (2015). These kinds of infra-
structure investments lower the costs of knowledge production for firms locat-
ed close enough to use them, which draws technology producers to the area. 
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tives,99 but little is gained from a global welfare perspective if 
the new facility in Israel simply replaces one in California. In-
deed, studies of U.S. states provide some evidence of a “beggar-
thy-neighbor” effect from state tax incentives for R&D.100 Theo-
retical work similarly suggests that international competition 
may lead to supraoptimal subsidies for R&D under certain cir-
cumstances.101 
We are agnostic as to whether this story of overinvestment 
due to local production externalities is a plausible one. To see 
why it might not be, consider again the example of bakeries 
that generate a positive local production externality—the smell 
of fresh bread. We can imagine residents banding together to 
subsidize bakeries in their neighborhood, and we can imagine 
bakeries moving from one neighborhood to another in order to 
capture such subsidies. But would this lead to too much pro-
duction of bread? It is not obvious why subsidies would lead to 
overproduction. No resident group would have an incentive to 
offer a subsidy larger than the local production externality (i.e., 
the benefit that the bakery brings to the neighborhood). Resi-
dent groups that place a higher value on the smell of bread 
might bid to lure bakeries to their neighborhoods, but this 
would likely lead to an even more efficient geographic distribu-
tion of bakeries—with bread being baked in the areas that ap-
preciate it most. 
To be sure, one can construct a model in which subsidies 
are supraoptimal. Let’s say that the supply of bread is inelastic; 
thus, the subsidy from residents to bakeries is a pure transfer, 
with no effect on output. But if the subsidy is financed through 
a mechanism (such as a tax) that itself yields deadweight loss, 
then the subsidy is in that sense supraoptimal: something is 
lost and nothing is gained. Why, though, would we expect the 
supply of bread (or of knowledge goods) to be inelastic? And 
even if supply is inelastic, subsidies may have efficiency-
enhancing effects: they may spur bakeries (or analogously, 
 
 99. See, e.g., David Shamah, How Intel Came To Be Israel’s Best Tech 
Friend, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/how 
-intel-came-to-be-israels-best-tech-friend. 
 100. See, e.g., Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-
State, and Aggregate Effects of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 431 
(2009). 
 101. See Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, International R&D Ri-
valry and Industrial Strategy, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 707 (1983) (discussing the 
importance of R&D subsidies to domestic welfare). 
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knowledge producers) to relocate to the areas in which the local 
production externalities from their activities are highest. 
Our argument, then, is not a claim about overinvestment. 
Rather, our argument is that in a price-taking (non-strategic)102 
model, rational and self-interested states will invest in 
knowledge production up to the point that the marginal bene-
fits from a national-welfare perspective equal the marginal 
costs, and that the left side of the equation includes both the 
benefits that citizens of the state derive from the consumption 
of knowledge goods as well as positive local production exter-
nalities. The larger these terms are relative to the marginal 
global benefits, the less underinvestment we should expect to 
see. In sum, when knowledge goods are more local than glob-
al—i.e., when consumption is concentrated geographically and 
production generates positive externalities that depreciate 
across space—then the underinvestment problem described 
above is less of a problem. 
3. An Extension of the Formal Economic Model 
To illustrate how this richer understanding of knowledge 
goods affects the underinvestment hypothesis, we continue 
with the rudimentary formal model begun in Part I. As before, 
x is the level of investment in the production of a particular 
knowledge good; BA(x) is the benefit to consumers in SA from in-
vestment of x in the relevant good; Bglobal is the sum of all Bs for 
all nation-states; and C(x) is the cost of investing x. Also, as be-
fore, the globally optimal level of investment is xglobal*; and xA* < 
xglobal* when BA(x) < Bglobal(x). 
The presence of positive local production externalities fur-
ther complicates this story. Let PE(x) represent the production 
externality from x level of investment. Assume that the produc-
tion externality is captured entirely by the country that makes 
the investment. For instance, diabetes research might benefit 
all diabetes patients, but diabetes research in Israel might con-
fer an additional advantage on Israeli biotech firms who benefit 
from access to the talent pool of diabetes researchers attracted 
to Israel as a result of the investment. Once positive local pro-
duction externalities enter the picture, the solution to SA’s op-
timization problem changes. Now, SA sets xA* such that BA′(xA*) 
 
 102. Strategic interactions complicated this model: states may try to com-
mit to underinvestment so as to induce other states to invest more. See infra 
notes 226–30 and accompanying text. 
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+ PE′(xA*) = C′(xA*). As long as PE′(x) > 0, the addition of this 
term pushes xA* upward. 
This formalization allows us to make more precise claims 
about underinvestment. First, underinvestment becomes less 
severe as BA(x)/Bglobal(x) approaches 1, meaning that the 
knowledge good is closer to a local public good than a global 
one. (When BA(x)/Bglobal(x) = 1, the good is a pure cranberry good 
and the underinvestment problem goes away.) Second, under-
investment becomes less severe when PE′(x) is large relative to 
other terms in SA’s calculus. Another way to say this is that 
presence of positive local production externalities makes in-
vestment in the provision of knowledge goods more attractive 
from a national perspective. The underinvestment hypothesis 
appears most plausible when knowledge goods are global public 
goods and states are rational actors seeking to maximize abso-
lute gains. As we discuss below, however, the underinvestment 
hypothesis does not get us the whole way to a justification for 
the international IP regime, because IP is not the only way for 
consumer nation-states to compensate producer states. We pick 
up the question of institutional design in Part IV and discuss 
alternative institutional structures that might support coopera-
tive outcomes. Before that, though, we interrogate the assump-
tion that states are rational actors whose motive is to maximize 
the welfare of their own citizens. 
B. WHAT MOTIVATES NATION-STATES? 
Our predictions so far have been based on the assumption 
that states are rational actors that seek to maximize the abso-
lute welfare of their citizens. In the international relations lit-
erature, this assumption is associated with the theory of insti-
tutionalism (also known as “regime theory”).103 According to 
institutionalism, states are “rational egoists” that (at least 
sometimes) see each other as potential partners in mutually 
beneficial cooperative endeavors.104 Institutions such as inter-
 
 103. See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Real-
ist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 494 tbl.1 
(1988); Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anar-
chic World, 36 INT’L ORG. 299, 318 (1982) (noting that regime theory sees 
states as “actors [who] focus on their own returns and compare different out-
comes with an eye to maximizing their own gains” as distinguished from the 
“alternative conception” of states as “actors [who] seek to maximize the differ-
ence between their own returns and those of others”). 
 104. Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist 
Theory, 20 INT’L SECURITY 39, 39 (1995). 
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national agreements and organizations play a key role in this 
story.105 For institutionalists, the challenge of global public good 
production is largely a problem of institutional design, and ar-
rangements with incentive-compatible features can yield coop-
erative outcomes.106 
The institutionalist perspective thus maps nicely onto the 
economic account presented thus far of IP treaties as solving 
the uncompensated-externalities underinvestment problem. 
But the international political economy literature has present-
ed other accounts of how nation-states are motivated. In this 
Section, we examine three leading alternative accounts—
grounded in national security concerns, international norms, 
and domestic politics—and their implications for investment in 
knowledge goods. 
1. National Security 
Until recently, the “dominant theory” of international rela-
tions was not institutionalism—it was realism,107 which “paints 
a rather grim picture of world politics.”108 Like institutionalists, 
realists assume that nation-states are rational actors, but real-
ists believe that states are focused on relative rather than abso-
lute gains.109 This is because “[s]tates are potentially dangerous 
to each other,” are unsure of each other’s intentions, and 
want—more than anything else—to maintain their own sover-
eignty.110 
Based on these assumptions, realists predict that states 
will “aim to maximize their relative power position over other 
states”—or, at the very least, to “maintain[] the existing bal-
 
 105. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DIS-
CORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 244 (1984). 
 106. See Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International 
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 766–68 (2001). 
 107. See MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE 41 (1997); see also 
Thomas C. Walker & Jeffrey S. Morton, Re-Assessing the “Power of Power Poli-
tics” Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant?, 7 INT’L STUD. REV. 341 (2005) (docu-
menting decline in proportion of articles in international relations journals 
adopting a realist perspective). 
 108. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 
19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 9 (1994). 
 109. Id. at 12. 
 110. Id. at 10. More precisely, realists break these beliefs into five assump-
tions about the international system. Id. Different scholars frame these as-
sumptions slightly differently, e.g., Grieco, supra note 103, at 488, but these 
differences are not significant here. 
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ance of power.”111 In measuring “power,” realists look not only 
to a state’s military strength, but also to its supply of scientific 
and technological talent.112 Thus, realists predict that states 
will invest in science education and research in order to main-
tain power parity with (or gain a relative advantage over) po-
tential rivals.113 
The “Space Race” between the United States and Soviet 
Union in the second half of the twentieth century is—at least 
arguably114—an illustration of realist predictions proving to be 
correct. The successful launch of the first artificial satellite, 
Sputnik, by the Soviet Union in 1957 (combined with the initial 
failures of the United States’ Vanguard satellite program)115 
shattered the American public’s post-World War II sense of se-
curity.116 The same rockets that put a satellite in orbit could, 
hypothetically, carry a nuclear warhead onto American soil. 
Perhaps more frighteningly, Sputnik seemed to be the tangible 
confirmation of reports from the mid-1950s that the Soviet Un-
ion was producing two to three times the number of scientists 
and engineers as the United States.117 The national security 
 
 111. Mearsheimer, supra note 108, at 11 & n.27; see also Grieco, supra note 
103, at 498 (“[R]ealists find that . . . the fundamental goal of states in any rela-
tionship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabili-
ties.”). 
 112. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, FRANCE IN THE AGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
STATE 15 (1968) (“[S]cientific research has become a primary determinant of 
national power . . . .”); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER 
POLITICS 56 (2001) (noting that scientific achievements are an indicator of “la-
tent capabilities” that a state can convert into military power). 
 113. See, e.g., GILPIN, supra note 112 (“[T]he three goals of French foreign 
policy [in the 1960s]—the continued military deterrence of the Soviet Union, 
the economic and political containment of the United States, and the estab-
lishment of French primacy in western Europe—are greatly dependent on the 
state of French science and technology. For this reason . . . the advancement of 
scientific research has become a dominant concern of the leadership of con-
temporary France.”); Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science, Technology and Military 
Policy, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PER-
SPECTIVE 443, 445 (Ina Spiegel-Rösing et al. eds., 1977) (“Governments have 
long acted as patrons of science in the hope of gaining improvements in the 
instruments and techniques of war; what is new in our time is the scale of the 
patronage offered and the impact which science has had on warfare.”). 
 114. But see Rodger A. Payne, Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisen-
hower’s Response to Sputnik, 21 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 89 (1994) (question-
ing the realist account). 
 115. See Roger Launius, Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age, NASA, 
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 116. See PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY 4 (2001). 
 117. See David Kaiser, The Physics of Spin: Sputnik Politics and American 
Physicists in the 1950s, 73 SOC. RES. 1225, 1227 (2006). 
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implications of this technological gap prompted the United 
States to quickly make scientific education and space-related 
technologies national priorities. Within two years of Sputnik’s 
launch, Congress increased funding for the National Science 
Foundation from $40 million to $140 million,118 created NASA 
to coordinate and fund the space program,119 and launched the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (now DARPA) within the 
Department of Defense.120 After years of reluctance to provide 
federal assistance to education, Congress passed the National 
Defense Education Act in 1958 to increase the number of stu-
dents in science at advanced levels.121 Maintaining an edge in 
scientific talent began to be seen as essential to the long-term 
security of the United States.122 And those national security 
concerns catalyzed public spending on R&D, setting the stage 
for countless future scientific advances (not the least of which 
was “ARPANET,” the technological foundation of today’s Inter-
net).123 
The realist perspective on public R&D spending starkly 
contrasts with the free-rider narrative. If the free-rider account 
is correct, then we would expect Country A’s spending on R&D 
to decrease as Country B’s R&D spending increases (i.e., Coun-
 
 118. National Science Foundation Budget, 127 SCIENCE 510 (1958). 
 119. See Launius, supra note 115. 
 120. See Duncan Graham-Rowe, Fifty Years of DARPA: A Surprising Histo-
ry, NEW SCIENTIST (May 15, 2008), https://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
dn13908-fifty-years-of-darpa-a-surprising-history. 
 121. See BARBARA BARKSDALE CLOWSE, BRAINPOWER FOR THE COLD WAR: 
THE SPUTNIK CRISIS AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 at 
4 (1981). 
 122. See Donald A. Quarles, Cultivating Our Science Talent—Key to Long-
Term Security, 80 SCI. MONTHLY 352 (1955); see also ISAACSON, supra note 92, 
at 72 (“War mobilizes science . . . and this was especially true in the mid-
twentieth century. Many of the paramount technological feats of that era—
computers, atomic power, radar, and the Internet—were spawned by the mili-
tary.”). 
 123. See Sharon Weinberger, Still in the Lead?, 451 NATURE 390 (2008). 
The expressed desire to maintain comparative technological superiority did 
not die with the fall of the Soviet Union. For example, news that China is 
poised to surpass the United States in research and development spending by 
2022 was greeted not with joy that there will be more knowledge production 
for us to free-ride on, but with concern about the need to preserve “American 
superiority.” Jacqueline Klimas, Lawmakers Worry China Will Top U.S. in 
Scientific Research, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/27/lawmakers-worry-china-will-top-us 
-scientific-resea. One congressman was quoted as saying, “I wish we could be 
investing even more, especially as other nations are rising to challenge our 
pre-eminence.” Id. (quoting Representative Adam B. Schiff). 
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try A would stand aside as Country B plows ahead). The realist 
perspective yields quite a different prediction: insofar as Coun-
try A and Country B are potential military rivals, Country A’s 
spending on R&D will increase with Country B’s. Rather than 
free-riding off Country A’s expenditures, Country B will bolster 
its R&D efforts in an attempt to keep pace. Moreover, while the 
free-rider narrative predicts that aggregate public spending on 
R&D will fall below the global social optimum, realism suggests 
the possibility of the opposite result. One country’s efforts to 
boost its own scientific and technological capabilities—and thus 
its security—may decrease the security of others.124 In this way, 
a lack of coordination among countries with respect to R&D 
spending may result in each country investing more than the 
globally optimal amount in certain areas of science and tech-
nology. 
One might question whether the realist account has any 
explanatory power beyond the limited domain of defense and 
defense-related technology. Moreover, while the realist account 
might suggest the possibility of overinvestment (at least in 
some areas), it might also lead us to expect to see 
“undersharing” (i.e., states focused on relative gains will keep 
their scientific and technological advances secret from potential 
rivals).125 In practice, though, even research for which the pri-
mary results are not shared can lead to significant spillovers.126 
Furthermore, we observe defense research agencies investigat-
ing a wide array of topics and publicizing their results on sub-
jects ranging from concussion prevention127 to climate change128 
 
 124. Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD 
POL. 167, 170 (1978). 
 125. For example, U.S. patents can be kept secret when the government 
determines that publication would be a national security threat. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 181 (2012); see, e.g., G.W. Schulz, Government Secrecy Orders on Patents 
Have Stifled More than 5,000 Inventions, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www 
.wired.com/2013/04/gov-secrecy-orders-on-patents. 
 126. For example, the space race led to developments ranging from satellite 
television to carbon monoxide detectors. Rob Mead, 10 Tech Breakthroughs To 
Thank the Space Race for, TECHRADAR (July 20, 2009), http://www.techradar 
.com/us/news/world-of-tech/10-tech-breakthroughs-to-thank-the-space-race-for 
-617847. 
 127. Kris Osborn, NFL-Army Collaborative Research on Concussions Yields 
Initial Results, SCOUT (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/ 
story/1613090-army-nfl-test-high-tech-helmets-for-safety. 
 128. Kris Osborn, Navy Researchers Are Analyzing Findings from Drones 
Beneath Arctic Ice, SCOUT (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.scout.com/military/ 
warrior/story/1618090-navy-drones-patrol-beneath-arctic-ice. 
  
206 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:167 
 
to the treatment of infectious diseases.129 To be sure, some of 
this research may be driven by motives unrelated to national 
security; the fact that it is carried out by a defense research 
agency could be bureaucratic happenstance. However, we think 
that a realist approach might offer some relevant insights. 
For some scholars in the realist tradition, the perception of 
power is as important as power itself.130 Capabilities are useful 
to states in international politics not only because they can be 
deployed in wartime, but because they can be used to deter or 
influence other states in peacetime. A state that amasses scien-
tific and technological capabilities may want to send signals to 
other states clueing them into that fact. Yet for reasons that 
are obvious, the United States might not want to invite a cadre 
of Russian Air Force generals to inspect its latest fighter jet. 
Instead, the United States wants Russia to know that the 
United States has the capability to develop cutting-edge wea-
ponry but does not want to share too many details of its tech-
nology with a potential rival. 
One way to accomplish this objective is for the United 
States to publicize the results of research showing that its sci-
entists are top-rate. Ideally, the research would be relevant 
enough to defense applications that it would lead Russia to 
raise its estimate of U.S. military capabilities—but not so close-
ly related to defense applications that publicizing the results 
would amount to giving away the store. The research need not 
be conducted by the U.S. military itself as long as the results 
lead Russia to elevate its estimate of the quality of scientists 
that the U.S. military might have at its disposal. Of course, if 
the research product also yields benefits for U.S. consumers, 
then all the better. But the selection of research projects for 
signaling purposes does not necessarily follow the marginal 
cost/marginal benefit calculus discussed above. 
We cannot say how much government-sponsored research 
is explained by our signaling story; we offer the signaling theo-
ry simply as a reason why security-focused states might invest 
in science and technology. The signaling account is probably 
 
 129. See, e.g., DEFENCE SCI. & TECH. LAB., LICENSING OPPORTUNITY: 
GAMMA-GLUTAMYL TRANSPEPTIDASE ATTENUATED FRANCISELLA (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399418/Gamma-glutamyl_transpeptidase_attenuated_Francisella_Easy_ 
Access_IP_factsheet.pdf. 
 130. See William C. Wohlforth, The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-
1914 Balance, 39 WORLD POL. 353, 353–54 (1987). 
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most plausible with respect to military powers (e.g., the United 
States and Russia) that are keenly concerned about the way 
that other states perceive their capabilities; it is a less plausi-
ble explanation for public R&D spending in, say, Switzerland.131 
For present purposes, our point is only that some nation-states 
may finance the production of knowledge goods even in circum-
stances where the conventional account might suggest that 
they would not (i.e., where the marginal benefit to domestic 
consumers is less than the marginal cost). 
2. Norms 
A more recent rival to realism and institutionalism is “con-
structivism.”132 Unlike realists and institutionalists, who start 
from fixed assumptions about state interests, constructivists 
seek to “open[] up . . . the black box of interest and identity 
formation”; their central claim is that state interests emerge 
from their interactions with other states and international in-
stitutions.133 The difference between realists and institution-
alists, on the one side, and constructivists, on the other, is 
sometimes described as the difference between a “logic of con-
sequences” and a “logic of appropriateness.”134 Whereas realists 
and institutionalists assume that states act strategically in or-
der to achieve their individual goals, constructivists argue that 
interstate interactions help to determine what goals each state 
pursues.135 Phrased differently, constructivists believe that 
 
 131. Note, though, that Japan—whose constitution outlaws war as a means 
of settling interstate disputes—may gain substantial security benefits from 
the perception that its scientists could, if pressed, develop offensive nuclear 
capabilities very quickly. Cf. Jeffrey Lewis, If Japan Wanted to Build a Nucle-
ar Bomb It’d Be Awesome at It, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 26, 2014), http://www 
.foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be 
-awesome-at-it (discussing Japan’s potential nuclear capabilities). 
 132. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Rela-
tions Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 324, 324–25 (1998); John Gerard Ruggie, What 
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Construc-
tivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 856 (1998). 
 133. Checkel, supra note 132, at 326. 
 134. See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynam-
ics of International Political Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 949–52 (1998). 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 949; see also Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, Internation-
al Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 965 (2000) 
(reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 
(1999)) (“[Constructivists] argue that international norms help constitute the 
identity of actors on the international stage (such as nations and rulers) and 
help shape their interests. In this way, national behaviors are significantly 
influenced by international norms in ways that do not reduce to an instrumen-
  
208 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:167 
 
states, “through their social interaction in accordance with the 
characteristic rules and processes of [the international] system, 
learn from and confirm to each other what it means to be a 
state.”136 And as states update their understanding of what the 
international system expects from them, they conform their be-
havior to the prevailing logic of appropriateness. 
All of this might sound highly abstract, but a concrete ex-
ample may help to illustrate. Martha Finnemore observes that 
through the mid-1960s, “poverty alleviation” was not “an ex-
plicitly articulated and internationalized goal of states and 
multilateral governmental agencies”; rather, development ef-
forts by states and international organizations focused primari-
ly on growth.137 Finnemore further argues that the World Bank, 
under the leadership of Robert McNamara, played a pivotal 
role in convincing states in the late 1960s and 1970s to redirect 
their development efforts from the goal of growth to the goal of 
poverty alleviation.138 That is, McNamara and the World Bank 
triggered a “normative shift” resulting in a widespread belief 
that poverty alleviation was something “that states were sup-
posed to do.”139 McNamara and the World Bank succeeded in al-
tering the logic of appropriateness, such that states now believe 
that the international community expects them to make pov-
erty reduction a policy priority.140 Constructivist scholars have 
pointed to other “normative shifts”—on matters ranging from 
slavery to the killing of whales and elephants—that appear to 
be the result of similar dynamics.141 
Just as realism directs our attention to security concerns 
and institutionalism directs our attention to the design fea-
tures of international organizations and agreements, construc-
tivism directs our attention to the norms that guide state be-
havior. On the constructivist view, states will invest in 
knowledge production if they come to perceive science as some-
thing states are supposed to do. Similarly, a state’s choice be-
tween IP and non-IP mechanisms will depend not only on the 
 
tal calculus.”). 
 136. David Armstrong, Globalization and the Social State, 24 REV. INT’L 
STUD. 461, 468 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 137. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIE-
TY 96–97 (1996). 
 138. Id. at 103–27. 
 139. Id. at 90. 
 140. Id. at 125. 
 141. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of 
Norms in International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479 (1990). 
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perceived costs and benefits of those tools, but also on the per-
ceived appropriateness of each approach. 
Constructivism helps to explain the widespread creation of 
science policy organizations by developing countries in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century. Starting in the 1950s, 
officials of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) began to encourage member 
states to set up their own science bureaucracies and to invest in 
R&D domestically.142 A UN report at the dawn of the next dec-
ade declared that “[s]tates should make it their business” to 
promote scientific research within their own borders.143 In 1967, 
a UNESCO statement of principles proclaimed that “[t]he de-
velopment of science policy should be the responsibility of an 
organization at the highest level of government” in each coun-
try.144 These and similar statements reflected an emerging in-
ternational norm: scientific research, according to UNESCO of-
ficials, was something states ought to do, even if a rational-
choice calculus would suggest that free-riding was the optimal 
strategy. 
Martha Finnemore has shown how an emerging logic of 
appropriateness led small developing countries—including 
Lebanon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia—to 
establish national science organizations by the end of the 
1960s, with a view to promoting domestic R&D.145 These efforts 
are difficult to explain from the perspective of rational institu-
tionalism. As Finnemore notes, these nations may have been 
materially better off if they had followed a free-riding strate-
gy.146 Realism is no more helpful; there is no apparent reason to 
believe that developing countries achieved any security benefits 
as a result of their R&D investments. Finnemore’s case studies 
suggest that at least some public R&D spending is best under-
stood as a reflection of prevailing international norms, not as a 
consequence of economic or security considerations.147 
 
 142. Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of 
Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization 
and Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG. 565, 576 (1993). 
 143. PIERRE AUGER, UNESCO, CURRENT TRENDS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
220 (1961). 
 144. UNESCO, Principles and Problems of National Science Policy, in 5 
SCI. POL’Y STUD. & DOCUMENTS SERIES 87, 87 (1967). 
 145. Finnemore, supra note 142, at 587–91. 
 146. Id. at 583. 
 147. Id. at 592. 
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This norms-based account might be reframed as a prestige-
based account: investments in the production of knowledge 
goods (and, in particular, investments that yield successful re-
sults) raise a nation-state’s standing in the international com-
munity. The pursuit of prestige—like the quest for security in 
the realist account—may be a zero-sum game: if prestige is rel-
ative, then one nation-state’s investment in increasing its own 
prestige may decrease the utility of other states.148 Alternative-
ly, prestige may serve as a substitute for cash transfers from 
consumer nation-states to producer nation-states. For example, 
if the U.S. National Institutes for Health (NIH) develops a suc-
cessful Ebola vaccine and gives it away to patients in West Af-
rican countries at zero cost, the United States may be partially 
compensated for its efforts through prestige gains.149 A full-
fledged prestige-based account would require a more careful 
specification of the particular benefits that prestige brings as 
well as the reasons why nation-states pursue those benefits. 
While we do not develop such an account here, we note the pos-
sibility that elements of the constructivist account may be 
translatable into a rational-actor model in which TBA (the 
transfer from the consumer state to the producer state) takes a 
nonmonetary form. 
To be sure, nothing in constructivist theory suggests that 
international norms will always lead countries to invest more 
in R&D. Norms can push nations in the opposite direction—for 
example, leading states not to invest in research related to ge-
netically modified organisms (GMOs).150 The key point is that 
constructivist theory, like realism, may aid in explaining why 
patterns of public R&D spending diverge from the free-rider ac-
count’s predictions. Constructivism cannot, however, tell us the 
direction or magnitude of that divergence in all cases. 
 
 148. See Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International 
Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 701, 704 (1991). 
 149. For a discussion of NIH efforts to find an Ebola vaccine, see Thomas 
M. Burton, NIH Expands Testing of Ebola Drugs and Vaccines into New Coun-
tries, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-expands 
-ebola-research-into-new-countries-in-search-for-vaccine-1435093932. 
 150. See Robert Falkner, The Political Economy of ‘Normative Power’ Eu-
rope: EU Environmental Leadership in International Biotechnology Regula-
tion, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 507 (2007) (discussing the spread of Europe’s more-
restrictive GMO regulatory regime through European “normative” leadership). 
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3. Domestic Politics 
A fourth perspective, known in the international relations 
literature as “liberalism” or “liberal intergovernmentalism,” 
shares key features of the other three approaches but focuses 
attention on actors “above and below the nation-state.”151 Like 
realism and institutionalism, liberalism sees behavior on the 
international stage as the product of instrumentally rational 
action.152 And like constructivism, liberalism opens up the 
“black box” of state interests. A foundational assumption of lib-
eral international relations theory is that “[t]he fundamental 
actors in international politics are individuals and private 
groups, who are on the average rational” and who use state in-
stitutions to pursue their goals.153 On this view, state action re-
flects the preferences of a subset of domestic society that has 
prevailed in political competition.154 Liberals do not deny that 
the balance of power and the configuration of international in-
stitutions affect outcomes, but they posit that these variables 
have only a secondary influence. Liberals argue that “what 
states want is the primary determinant of what they do”—and 
“what states want” is primarily a function of who has won out 
in domestic political competition.155 
The liberal perspective thus focuses our attention on inter-
est groups at the domestic level who compete to influence na-
tional policy. Liberalism predicts that states will invest in sci-
ence if—and only if—the beneficiaries of such investment have 
sufficient pull among policymakers domestically. Similarly, the 
selection of IP vs. non-IP tools will reflect interest-group poli-
tics. That is, state investment in knowledge production may 
have little to do with relative power (realism), absolute gains 
(institutionalism), or prevailing norms (constructivism), but 
will have much to do with the prevailing political alignment in-
side the state. 
An optimistic version of the liberal account might posit 
that, at least in democratic countries, leaders will be responsive 
to public opinion and that the public generally supports domes-
tic R&D spending. In the United States, for instance, a Pew 
 
 151. See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Lib-
eral Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997) (discussing lib-
eralism as a theory of international politics). 
 152. Id. at 516–20. 
 153. Id. at 516–20 (emphasis omitted). 
 154. Id. at 518. 
 155. Id. at 521. 
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survey in 2013 found that even when faced with a possible 
budget sequester, seventy-seven percent of the public wanted to 
maintain or increase research funding, while only twenty per-
cent favored cuts.156 A poll the following year found that seven-
ty-one percent of U.S. adults believed that government invest-
ment in basic scientific research would “pay off in the long 
run.”157 Surveys in the United Kingdom and Japan find similar 
support for government spending on scientific research.158 Per-
haps these poll numbers reflect the fact that voters are con-
ducting their own cost-benefit calculus and concluding that in-
vestment in R&D is a welfare-improving use of public 
resources. But given how difficult it is for even the most highly 
skilled economist to calculate the optimal level of public in-
vestment in R&D, a more plausible conclusion is that most vot-
ers support science spending based on a rough guess that bene-
fits exceed costs rather than a rigorous cost-benefit evaluation. 
A more pessimistic version of the liberal account, influ-
enced by public choice theory rather than a faith in democratic 
processes, might lead us to consider whether some share of 
public R&D spending reflects rent-seeking activities by benefi-
ciaries of such expenditures. Indeed, the same public-goods log-
ic underlying the free-rider narrative suggests that well-
organized interest groups will successfully extract wealth 
transfers from the state. Protection of the public fisc is itself a 
public good, as all taxpayers stand to benefit from the prudent 
allocation of government resources. In the political struggle be-
tween concentrated subsidy-seeking industry groups on the one 
hand and diffuse taxpayers on the other, we anticipate that 
free-riding behavior will be more rampant on the latter side, 
tilting the competitive balance in favor of the former.159 At least 
 
 156. As Sequester Deadline Looms, Little Support for Cutting Most Pro-
grams, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/ 
02/22/as-sequester-deadline-looms-little-support-for-cutting-most-programs. 
 157. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS, POLITICS AND SCIENCE ISSUES  
76 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/07/2015-07-01_science-and 
-politics_FINAL-1.pdf. 
 158. See 1 NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2002, at 
7–15 (2002) (noting that agreement with the statement “[e]ven if it brings no 
immediate benefits, scientific research that advances the frontiers of 
knowledge is necessary and should be supported by the Federal Government” 
has “consistently been in the 80-percent range” in the United States, and was 
seventy-two percent in the United Kingdom in 2000 and eighty percent in Ja-
pan in 1995 (citations omitted)). 
 159. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
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some amount of public support for R&D may be attributed to 
this imbalance.160 
Not all rents will take the form of direct subsidies to inter-
est groups. For example, IP protection may serve as an indirect 
way of transferring rents to producers of knowledge goods—
with the aforementioned advantage that IP does not require 
politicians to raise taxes.161 Many accounts of the political econ-
omy of copyright lawmaking seem to fit within this more pes-
simistic vision of liberalism, with industry rent-seekers leading 
to over-protection,162 raising questions about the validity of the 
underinvestment hypothesis for many creative works. 
Rent extraction through R&D support also may be a way of 
skirting international trade law limits on production subsi-
dies.163 For instance, instead of an outright subsidy to aircraft 
manufacturers (which might trigger WTO sanctions),164 the 
U.S. federal government might sponsor research on jet propul-
sion with potential applications for U.S. companies. To be sure, 
the indirect subsidy might not have its intended effect if foreign 
aircraft manufacturers can make use of the research findings 
just as easily as U.S. manufacturers can. Yet if U.S. firms—due 
to their proximity to the scientists carrying on the research—
are better able to operationalize the results, then government 
support for the project might function much like a production 
subsidy while differing in name.165 
 
 160. See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of 
Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 363–64 (2006) (noting 
that the “principal recipients” of the research credit under 26 U.S.C. § 41 
(2012) are “large U.S. manufacturing corporations” who are “more than willing 
to invest in lobbying activities and campaign donations to ensure continuance 
of this large tax savings”). 
 161. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 740, 740 (2013) (“Complaints have been legion that copyright 
industry groups and corporate copyright owners have sought and too often ob-
tained extremely strong and overly long copyright protections that interfere 
with downstream creative endeavors and legitimate consumer expectations.”). 
 163. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
in 2 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 83 (P. Macrory, A. Appleton & M. Plummer eds., 2005) (discussing 
subsidy interaction with international trade laws). 
 164. See, e.g., EU Launches New Trade Dispute with US over Boeing Sub-
sidies: WTO, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp 
-eu-launches-new-trade-dispute-with-us-over-boeing-subsidies-wto-2014-12. 
 165. Why might U.S. firms have an advantage in operationalizing the re-
sults? Presumably the results would be published in English, and the scien-
tists might be willing to meet with counterparts from U.S. firms. Moreover, 
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As with constructivism, the liberal perspective does not 
necessarily lead us to reject the underinvestment hypothesis. 
Just as beneficiaries of public support for R&D may lobby in-
tensively for increasing expenditures, other constituencies (e.g., 
deficit hawks and tax-cut advocates) may push politicians in 
the opposite direction. But the liberal perspective does suggest 
that the process of determining domestic R&D spending levels 
is more complicated than the standard stories of free-riding and 
uncompensated externalities suggest. Even where free-riding 
would appear to be the optimal strategy from a national wel-
fare perspective, corporate and other interest groups may con-
vince politicians to devote additional resources to domestic 
R&D. By the same token, even where the internalized benefits 
of R&D investment would appear to exceed the budgetary costs, 
domestic politics may stand in the way of spending hikes. 
What does all this mean for the conventional economic ac-
count of international coordination as a solution to the under-
investment problem? The short answer is that we cannot be 
certain; the underinvestment hypothesis is empirically unveri-
fiable but intuitively plausible, at least with respect to 
knowledge goods of the global-public-good variety. While we 
expect that nation-states will be influenced by a variety of fac-
tors not captured in our rudimentary economic model, we have 
no strong reason to believe that these other factors will system-
atically favor underinvestment or overinvestment. Another way 
to say this is that for knowledge goods of the global-public-good 
type, the underinvestment hypothesis may yield an accurate 
but noisy estimate of state behavior; while we expect that be-
havior will diverge from the hypothesis’s predictions in count-
less cases, we have no strong reason to expect systematic diver-
gence in one direction or the other. 
III.  DOMESTIC DIVERSITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL IP 
LAW   
Under the “harmonization hypothesis” presented in Part I, 
agreements such as TRIPS dictate how nation-states subsidize 
and allocate knowledge goods at the domestic level, leading to 
“too much” IP and “too little” support for non-IP mechanisms. 
As we explain here, however, the existence of a global IP re-
 
U.S. firms might be able to hire the scientists themselves after the project is 
complete, making the transfer of knowledge from government to domestic in-
dustry even more seamless. 
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gime does not require any individual nation-state to rely on IP 
as a mechanism for incentivizing innovation or allocating ac-
cess to knowledge goods at the domestic level. At first glance, 
this claim may seem surprising. After all, if a country signs a 
global IP treaty such as TRIPS, doesn’t that obligate the coun-
try to provide protection for IP domestically? To a limited ex-
tent, the answer is yes: a TRIPS signatory must establish copy-
right and patent systems that meet minimum standards and 
treat citizens of other signatories at least as favorably as its 
own citizens.166 Yet, as we explain in the following two sections, 
TRIPS still leaves individual nations substantial leeway to 
adopt alternative arrangements for both the provision and allo-
cation of knowledge goods within their own borders. 
A. THE SEPARABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
INCENTIVES 
International IP treaties require nation-states to offer min-
imum levels of IP protection for knowledge production, which 
ensures that foreign consumers bear some of the cost of domes-
tic innovation through the higher prices they pay on IP-
protected goods. This appears to create an asymmetry between 
IP and non-IP incentives, in that foreign consumers need not 
contribute to non-IP subsidies for knowledge production, even 
when they reap substantial benefits. But the existence of inter-
national IP treaties means that nation-states can in fact seek 
compensation from foreign consumers. That is, the internation-
al IP system allows states to internalize some of the benefits of 
knowledge produced through public finance mechanisms. 
Most directly, recipients of knowledge-production subsidies 
such as prizes, grants, and tax credits could be required to as-
sign all IP rights to the state, which could enforce those rights 
abroad. Thus, the fact that a country has signed onto a global 
IP treaty doesn’t mean that the country must use IP to incen-
tivize information production at the domestic level. Rather, a 
country that signs onto a global IP treaty acquires the option to 
seek compensation from foreign users of domestically produced 
knowledge goods, while retaining the freedom to choose what-
ever innovation-incentive mechanism it pleases at the domestic 
level.167 
 
 166. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www 
.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 167. Commentators advocating for opt-in medical prize schemes have noted 
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This possibility is not purely hypothetical. U.S. federal 
agencies that develop knowledge goods in-house often retain IP 
rights to their inventions and then license those inventions in-
ternationally (as well as domestically).168 But a state need not 
assert foreign IP rights itself to obtain compensation from 
abroad; it could also allow the innovator to assert these rights 
and then collect a share of the profits through taxation. The 
U.S. federal government offers a tax credit equal to twenty per-
cent of research expenses above a “base amount” (the base 
amount is calculated on the basis of the taxpayer’s historical 
research expenditures),169 but the federal government effective-
ly reclaims a portion of the returns to R&D when it imposes a 
tax on corporate and individual income. 
Recipients of federal research grants in the United States 
are also able to patent inventions resulting from that research 
under the Bayh-Dole Act and license them for domestic manu-
facture (a regime that has been replicated in many other coun-
tries).170 Then, when foreign consumers purchase goods and 
 
that these systems are clearly TRIPS compliant. HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 
61, at 106; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE 
HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT 
IT (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript ch. 5, at 37), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
people/tfisher/Infection_Prizes.pdf. Opt-in prize systems need not be imple-
mented on a global scale: an individual country can offer a prize for relin-
quishment of domestic IP rights while still enforcing IP rights abroad. 
 168. In 2014, the National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, and Food and Drug Administration brought in over $137 mil-
lion in patent royalties. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, OTT STATISTICS, http://www 
.ott.nih.gov/ott-statistics (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). The Departments of En-
ergy and Defense are active patenters as well. PAUL W. HEISEY ET AL., U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GOVERNMENT PATENTING AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 16 (2006), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/471043/ 
err15_1_.pdf. The phenomenon is not limited to the United States: the gov-
ernments of France, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India have all 
amassed patent portfolios (including, in some cases, acquiring patent rights 
from abroad). HOSUK LEE-MAKIYAMA & PATRICK MESSERLIN, EUR. CTR. FOR 
INT’L POLITICAL ECON., SOVEREIGN PATENT FUNDS (SPFS): NEXT-GENERATION 
TRADE DEFENCE? 3–4 (2014), http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/PB06.pdf. 
 169. 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 170. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2012); David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. 
Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University–Industry Technology 
Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
EDWIN MANSFIELD 233, 241 (Albert N. Link & F. M. Scherer eds., 2005); An-
thony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from 
the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIO. 2078 (2008) (suggesting safeguards to apply in 
developing countries). For examples of domestic-industry provisions in the 
equivalent of Bayh-Dole in other countries, see Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Scientific and Technological Progress (promulgated by the Standing 
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services protected by that IP, the IP “shadow tax” is transferred 
back to the domestic manufacturer and from the manufacturer 
to the U.S. patentee.171 One might ask whether the federal gov-
ernment is really “reclaiming” any of the payment from foreign 
consumers if the payment flows to a tax-exempt private re-
search institution, such as Stanford or the University of Chica-
go. In at least one sense, the answer is “yes”: the tax exemption 
for private universities is a “tax expenditure”—economically lit-
tle different from any other appropriation172—so the federal 
government is effectively claiming a share of the foreign bene-
fits and then giving that share back to the patenting universi-
ties. 
(To be sure, there are good reasons why the United States 
does not set its tax rate at one hundred percent.) In virtually 
every case, the flow of royalties from a foreign consumer to a 
U.S. patentee can be redescribed as (1) a payment from the for-
eign consumer to the U.S. government; and (2) a decision by the 
U.S. government as to what percentage of the royalties should 
flow through to the U.S. patentee. The international IP regime 
sets a framework for setting the size of the payment at step one 
but allows the producer state substantial autonomy at step 
two.173 
One might question whether, as a practical matter, nation-
states in fact have the capacity to tax IP income earned by do-
mestic innovators from foreign sales. The slow progress of the 
 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 2, 1993, rev’d Dec. 29, 2007, effective July 1, 
2008), art. 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO. 82; Intellectual Property 
Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act 51 of 2008 § 11 
(S. Afr.). 
 171. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 172. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (providing tax exemptions for educa-
tional and scientific organizations, among others); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATH-
WAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES vii (1973) (com-
paring tax incentives and direct government expenditures). 
 173. See TRIPS, supra note 14. In this respect, our analysis suggests a 
counterargument to Benjamin Roin’s claim that intellectual property “limits 
[the government’s] ability to expropriate socially valuable innovations.” Roin, 
supra note 9, at 1071. In Roin’s view, IP laws allow a state to make a credible 
commitment to innovators that the state will allow them to reap the rewards 
from their own knowledge production efforts. Yet nothing in IP law limits the 
tax rate that a state can impose on patent rents earned by its own citizens. It 
may be the case that as a practical matter, states that grant IP protection to 
knowledge goods generated by their own citizens are unlikely to negate the 
benefits of IP protection through tax laws. But any such limits on the taxation 
of patent rents arise from domestic political economy and domestic (non-IP) 
law, not from the international IP regime. 
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Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, undertaken 
jointly by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) and the G20, might not inspire confidence 
on this score.174 Our argument is not that nation-states are un-
constrained in their ability to tax; in many cases, however, the 
principal constraint on the taxation of international IP income 
is political, not legal or technological. This is especially true 
with respect to the United States: as one of us has argued, the 
President and his Treasury Secretary already have the statuto-
ry authority to bring an end to strategies used by corporations 
such as Apple and Google to defer U.S. taxes on income from 
overseas sales.175 And even if a nation-state is limited in its ca-
pacity to tax overseas income earned by domestic firms, it still 
has the option of making government prizes and grants condi-
tional on the recipient relinquishing IP rights to a sovereign 
fund. 
More fundamentally, if a state seeks to maximize the wel-
fare of its citizens, it doesn’t matter whether the government 
can capture the benefits to foreign consumers as long as some-
one within the state does. If a federal grant to Stanford leads to 
a cure for lung cancer, and Stanford patents it worldwide and 
licenses it to Merck, then foreign consumers who benefit from 
the drug must pay a patent “tax” to U.S. entities: Stanford and 
Merck. Even if the federal government chooses not to reclaim 
any of those patent rents (e.g., if the federal government ex-
empts Stanford from paying income taxes), the benefit to for-
eign consumers is still internalized within the United States. A 
state seeking to maximize the welfare of its citizens would con-
sider that benefit when choosing how much grant funding for 
lung cancer to award in the first place. Or, in the language of 
our model, the federal government would consider something 
closer to Bglobal(x) than BUS(x) when setting its level of invest-
ment x for a lung cancer-related knowledge good, which may 
push x closer to the global optimum. 
 
 174. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 6 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2716125 (concluding that BEPS is an “inadequate” response to global 
tax avoidance because it continues to rely on taxing active income at the 
source and passive income at residence, rather than the other way around). 
 175. See Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 21–24), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 
2773329 (arguing that the President and his Treasury Secretary have the 
statutory authority to reclassify so-called “hybrid branches” as per se corpora-
tions). 
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Our argument has a potential application to the ongoing 
policy debate at the domestic level in the United States regard-
ing the Bayh-Dole Act, and to debates over exporting Bayh-
Dole to other countries.176 Critics of Bayh-Dole argue that the 
beneficiaries of public funding should be required—at least un-
der many circumstances—to place their inventions in the pub-
lic domain.177 While we are sympathetic to arguments for great-
er use of non-IP mechanisms for incentivizing innovation and 
allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic level, we 
suggest (perhaps surprisingly) that Bayh-Dole may actually en-
courage the use of alternatives to IP. The Bayh-Dole Act allows 
the United States to claim partial compensation from consum-
ers in other countries who benefit from U.S.-funded research. 
The federal government may claim some of these benefits itself 
through taxation of U.S. manufacturers; in other cases, the 
benefits flow to public universities and to private research in-
stitutions that the federal government has chosen to support 
through tax exemptions.178 The important point is that patent-
ing the results of federally funded research allows the United 
States to internalize some of the positive externalities generat-
ed through non-IP investments in innovation.179 Insofar as the 
relevant knowledge goods are global public goods and the Unit-
ed States is a rational, self-interested actor, we expect that the 
possibility of internalization will lead the U.S. to invest more in 
knowledge-good production through non-IP mechanisms. In 
other words, IP protection at the international level and non-IP 
innovation incentives at the domestic level may be comple-
ments, not substitutes. 
To the extent this flexibility in domestic innovation policy 
is desirable, our analysis highlights a potential benefit of Bayh-
Dole regimes that is generally overlooked. As a number of 
 
 176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and 
the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 
289, 310. For a review of the controversy surrounding the Bayh-Dole Act and a 
critique of existing justifications for many Bayh-Dole patents, see Ian Ayres & 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2748375. 
 178. In 2014, six of the top ten universities ranked by life sciences licensing 
income were public universities. See Brady Huggett, Top US Universities, In-
stitutes for Life Sciences in 2014, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1131, 1131 
(2015). 
 179. This argument applies to prizes and tax incentives as well as grants, 
which are generally used as complements to, not substitutes for, IP rights. See 
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 316. 
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scholars (including one of us) have pointed out, there are still 
significant costs on the other side of the ledger, which may, on 
net, warrant reform.180 But we think it is worth noting that the 
common concern that allowing IP protection on publicly sup-
ported works requires U.S. taxpayers to “pay twice”181 overlooks 
the point that not allowing IP protection permits non-U.S. con-
sumers to avoid paying at all. When combined with interna-
tional IP treaties, Bayh-Dole regimes may encourage states to 
increase direct public funding for research, alleviating 
Scotchmer’s concern that IP treaties at the international level 
will cause “too little public sponsorship” at the domestic level.182 
All of this is not to say that TRIPS places zero limits on a 
producer state’s innovation policy. To comply with TRIPS, a 
state must undertake the administrative expense of maintain-
ing an IP system, and it must conform its IP system to a set of 
core rules. It may not, for instance, limit the term of copyrights 
to less than the life of the author plus fifty years or the term of 
patents to less than twenty years, nor may it refuse to offer pa-
tents on inventions that are plainly patentable subject matter. 
Nonetheless, we think the constraints of TRIPS should not be 
overstated.183 TRIPS still leaves countries free to use non-IP in-
novation incentives, and it still leaves states free to determine 
the size of the rewards that will go to domestic producers of 
knowledge goods. 
 
 180. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 177 (reviewing the scholarly con-
sensus from works such as Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 177, that the only 
compelling justification for Bayh-Dole patents is that they provide an incen-
tive to commercialize some new technologies, and proposing a “market test” to 
determine the least amount of exclusivity under which a licensee will commer-
cialize). 
 181. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts 
on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 
(2000) (“The public winds up paying twice for such inventions, by both funding 
them and paying supracompetitive prices to use them.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996) (arguing 
that Bayh-Dole “seems to require the public to pay twice for the same inven-
tion”); Andrea Simon, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Copyrighting Gov-
ernment-Commissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 428, 433 (1984) (argu-
ing that government-commissioned artistic works should not be copyrightable 
because they are supported by “tens of billions of tax dollars annually” and 
“[c]opyright . . . forces the public to pay twice”). 
 182. Scotchmer, supra note 23. 
 183. Cf. Ouellette, supra note 59, at 121–24 (noting that TRIPS does allow 
countries to experiment with opt-in non-IP incentive systems, but lamenting 
the limits TRIPS places on experimentation with substantive patent law). 
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B. THE SEPARABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
ALLOCATION 
The international IP system also allows states substantial 
flexibility in allocating knowledge goods at the domestic level. 
Imagine a world with two countries—say, Japan and France—
that agree to provide IP protection for knowledge goods pro-
duced in the other country. If a Japanese firm receives a 
French patent, France must enforce a prohibition on infringe-
ment of the patent within French borders. Yet France remains 
free to decide that at the domestic level, the knowledge good 
patented by the firm ought not be allocated via the price mech-
anism. For instance, France may contract with the Japanese 
firm for an exclusive license within French borders. France 
may then choose any mechanism it wishes to allocate access 
domestically. It may, for example, auction off the exclusive li-
cense to domestic firms and allow the auction winner to control 
access. Alternatively, it may adopt an open-access approach 
whereby everyone in France can practice the invention free of 
charge. The agreement between Japan and France requires on-
ly that France pay the firm a bilaterally negotiated price for ac-
cess to the firm’s knowledge good or else enforce the firm’s pa-
tent. As long as the firm and France strike a deal, France may 
choose from a wide menu of domestic allocative options. 
This example is far from fanciful. As Benjamin Roin notes, 
most developed countries use a similar mechanism to allocate 
access to patented pharmaceuticals. After a firm obtains a pa-
tent on a pharmaceutical product, it generally agrees to sell the 
product in other countries at a government-set price. Those 
countries’ governments can choose for themselves how to allo-
cate product access within their own borders (e.g., through a 
single-payer system or through prescription drug insurance 
with a copay).184 For example, the United Kingdom uses a sys-
tem known as the Pharmaceutical Price Regulatory Scheme 
(PPRS) to set prices for branded medicines; it then allocates ac-
cess domestically through its taxpayer-funded National Health 
Service.185 If patent holders are unsatisfied with the PPRS 
price, they can choose to sell their products only on the private 
market, for which U.K. citizens can buy private insurance or 
 
 184. Roin, supra note 9, at 1012–13. 
 185. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION 
SCHEME 2014, at 9–10, 18–32, 41–56 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282523/Pharmaceutical_Price_ 
Regulation.pdf. 
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pay out of pocket.186 For our purposes, the key point is that dif-
ferent countries can choose different domestic allocation mech-
anisms even while subscribing to the same global IP frame-
work. 
There is, however, a potential hurdle for states that seek to 
allocate goods domestically through non-price mechanisms. In 
our hypothetical above, France might not be willing to pay a fee 
to the Japanese firm for a license to distribute the invention for 
free domestically if it thinks that its citizens will then resell the 
good to consumers in other countries. (We say “might not” ra-
ther than “will not”: French residents who resell the invention 
to foreign consumers still benefit—albeit in the form of cash ra-
ther than from the invention itself.) And the Japanese firm, for 
its part, might not be willing to sell a license to France if it 
thinks that French citizens will then resell the good in other 
markets and undercut the Japanese firm’s prices. 
In practice, we see nation-states and patent holders going 
to great lengths to make sure that knowledge goods distributed 
at a discount in one country are not later resold elsewhere. One 
striking example of this phenomenon comes from Egypt: Gilead 
Sciences, a pharmaceutical company based in California, has 
agreed to license the hepatitis C drug sofosbuvir to the Egyp-
tian government, which then distributes the pills to its own cit-
izens for free.187 Gilead sells sofosbuvir under the brand name 
Sovaldi in the United States for $1000 per one-a-day pill.188 To 
prevent Egyptians from reselling sofosbuvir pills abroad and 
undercutting Gilead’s price, Egypt requires that all pills be dis-
pensed by government pharmacies, and that all patients must 
hand in their last empty bottle in order to obtain a new bot-
tle.189 Moreover, as the New York Times reports, “[t]hose receiv-
ing new bottles must immediately unscrew the cap, break the 
seal and take the first pill in front of the pharmacist — making 
it nearly impossible to resell the bottle.”190 This example may be 
an extreme case, but other countries that distribute knowledge 
 
 186. Thus, when negotiating with the National Health Service, a patentee 
should not be willing to accept less in total profits than it could receive from 
these alternatives. Id. at 16. 
 187. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Curing Hepatitis C, in an Experiment the Size of 
Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/health/ 
hepatitis-c-treatment-egypt.html. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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goods to their own citizens on a non-price basis also take 
measures to block resale. For example, Uruguay—which has 
provided free laptops to hundreds of thousands of elementary 
school students and teachers—uses a serial number tracking 
system to tie laptops to individual students and requires that 
recipients of free laptops sign a declaration swearing not to re-
sell the computers.191 
Significantly, patentees (and the nation-states that license 
knowledge goods from patentees for domestic distribution) can-
not necessarily rely on international IP law to restrict resale. 
Under the doctrine known as international “first sale” or “ex-
haustion,” the first authorized sale (including a free distribu-
tion) of an IP-protected good in one country may exhaust IP 
rights in that good, such that the rightsholder cannot limit re-
sale.192 The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that international exhaustion applies 
to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad,193 but the 
en banc Federal Circuit has since decided that Kirtsaeng does 
not change the current rule that foreign sales do not exhaust 
U.S. patent rights.194 There is currently no international stand-
ard on IP exhaustion; rather, TRIPS explicitly states that 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”195 The absence of 
an international no-exhaustion rule potentially limits (but does 
not eliminate) the ability of nation-states to prevent the resale 
of subsidized goods to consumers abroad. 
* * * 
The observations in this Section and the previous one can 
be combined: the international IP system establishes a frame-
work for setting the size of transfers between nation-states that 
consume knowledge goods and nation-states that produce 
 
 191. ¿Cómo Acceder a la Compra de un Equipo Ceibal?, PLAN CEIBAL (Jan. 
28, 2015) http://www.ceibal.edu.uy/art%C3%ADculo/preguntas-frecuentes/ 
compra/Como-acceder-a-la-compra-de-un-equipo-Ceibal. 
 192. Under U.S. law, “patentees cannot circumvent the application of pa-
tent exhaustion principles by distributing a product embodying the patent for 
free.” LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
 193. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013). 
 194. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 760 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). We examine this international patent exhaustion 
issue in greater depth in a separate essay. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 
20. 
 195. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 6. 
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knowledge goods, but it does not dictate how nation-states re-
ward knowledge-good producers within their own borders, not 
does it dictate how nation-states distribute knowledge goods to 
their own citizens. A TRIPS signatory state may still choose 
non-IP mechanisms both for incentivizing innovation and for 
allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic level. Re-
gardless of what mechanisms it uses at the domestic level, a 
knowledge-good-producing nation-state retains the option of us-
ing the international IP system to demand that other countries 
share in the cost of producing global public goods, with the spe-
cifics of that cost-sharing to be determined via separate negoti-
ations. 
For example, the United States could—consistent with 
TRIPS—establish a taxpayer-financed prize for the first inven-
tor to patent a vaccine for the common cold, with the condition 
that any inventor claiming the prize must surrender the patent 
to the federal government. The federal government could then 
make the vaccine available domestically for free while charging 
for the right to practice the patent overseas. The U.S. and an-
other country (say, the U.K.) could then strike a deal whereby 
the U.K. pays an annual fee to the U.S. in exchange for the 
right to distribute the vaccine within the U.K.’s borders. And 
the U.K. could then distribute the vaccine to its own citizens for 
free or at a discount. In this example, the U.S. does not use the 
patent system to incentivize innovation at the domestic level, 
and neither it nor the U.K. uses the price mechanism to allo-
cate access. 
Yet even in cases like the example above—where the pro-
ducer state opts for a non-IP incentive mechanism and the con-
sumer state chooses to allocate access on a basis other than 
price—TRIPS remains relevant to the outcome. That is because 
TRIPS sets a baseline for negotiations between producers and 
consumers regarding cost-sharing. To continue with the formal 
model from above (with SB still the consumer nation-state and 
SA the producer), TRIPS sets a floor of PB|monopoly on the transfer 
from SB to SA (TBA). The profit that SA can extract from SB if it 
sells the relevant knowledge good at a monopoly price in SB 
functions as a floor on TBA because SA will reject any lower of-
fer from SB in licensing talks. (Note that SB almost certainly 
could not ban trade in the relevant good without running afoul 
of WTO rules.)196 At the same time, the doctrine of international 
 
 196. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1A, ¶ 1, 
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exhaustion may make it difficult for SA to extract significantly 
more than PB|monopoly from SB. If, for example, SA sought to de-
mand a licensing fee from SB in excess of PB|monopoly, SB could seek 
to acquire the relevant knowledge good on the secondary mar-
ket and avoid transacting directly with SA. 
To be sure, these conclusions come with caveats, and we 
conclude this Part with three limits on TRIPS’s effectiveness at 
setting TBA. First, this model is obviously inapplicable for the 
many knowledge goods that nation-states are not required to 
protect under TRIPS, ranging from hygiene checklists for in-
tensive-care units197 to results of failed research projects.198 
TRIPS thus does little to require a state that benefits from the-
se goods from compensating the state the produces them. Ac-
cordingly, if a producing state seeks to maximize the welfare of 
its citizens, it has little incentive to consider foreign benefits 
when setting its level of investment in goods for which the in-
ternational IP system fails to enable appropriability. If there is 
a global underinvestment problem, states may thus need to 
turn to non-IP coordination mechanisms.199 
A second qualification is that, even for goods that are clear-
ly protectable with IP, SB may decrease TBA by threatening to 
exercise its rights to issue a compulsory license under Article 
31 of TRIPS. That provision allows a signatory state to make 
use of a patent without the holder’s authorization, although the 
state still must provide “adequate remuneration” to the patent 
holder, “taking into account the economic value of the authori-
 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (incorporating the provisions 
of the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, § 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (“No prohibitions 
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges . . . shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party [unless a specific exception ap-
plies] . . . .”). 
 197. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 41, at 1902–03. 
 198. See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 
2050–52 (2012). 
 199. For example, Nicholson Price has explained that the nascent field of 
“black-box medicine”—complex computational models used for health care—
depends on knowledge goods that are not protectable under many IP laws: 
(1) aggregated data; (2) algorithms; and (3) validation. W. Nicholson Price II, 
Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421, 443–46 (2015). He thus 
argues for increased use of grants and prizes in these areas. Id. at 449–54. 
Given the high cost and likely global benefits of developing black-box medical 
algorithms, id. at 437–42, a global black-box medicine institute might be 
worthwhile. 
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zation.”200 (Except in cases of “national emergency,” a signatory 
state also must make “efforts to obtain authorization from the 
right holder on reasonable commercial terms” before it can 
make unauthorized use of the patent.)201 
A third caveat is that if SA can prevent other purchasers of 
the relevant knowledge good from reselling to SB, then SA might 
attempt to demand a payment from SB in excess of PB|monopoly. If 
SA has complete control over resale, such that SB can acquire 
the relevant knowledge good only through a direct transaction 
with SA, then TBA could conceivably take any value in the 
range [PB|monopoly, BB(x)]. Yet even in that extreme case, TRIPS 
effectively sets an upper bound of BB(x) on the transfer TBA 
from SB to SA. SB will never (or never rationally) pay more for a 
knowledge good than it stands to benefit from making the 
knowledge good freely available to its own citizens. As we dis-
cuss below, this last feature of the international IP regime is a 
potentially significant benefit relative to other mechanisms for 
setting the size of transfers from consumer states to producer 
states. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL IP LAW   
So far, we have argued that for a subset of knowledge 
goods, coordination among nation-states can address the under-
investment problem—i.e., the problem that nation-states acting 
on their own will invest in the production of global knowledge 
goods at less than the socially optimal level. We have also ar-
gued that the international IP regime offers at least a partial 
solution to the problem: by requiring consumer nation-states to 
make transfers to nation-states that produce global knowledge 
goods, international IP law ensures that producer states inter-
nalize at least some of the cross-border benefits generated by 
their (and their citizens’) knowledge production efforts. It is not 
immediately obvious, however, why nation-states have chosen 
international IP law as the framework for determining those 
 
 200. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31. From January 1995 to June 2011, there 
were twenty-four instances in which countries threatened to issue compulsory 
licenses for pharmaceuticals, most of which ended in either compulsory licens-
es or voluntary price reductions. Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Com-
pulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database 
Analysis, 9 PLOS MED., Jan. 2012, at 3. Aggressive price regulation may delay 
the launch of new drugs in that state. See Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patents and 
the Global Diffusion of New Drugs 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 20492, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20492.pdf. 
 201. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31(b). 
  
2016] KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND NATION-STATES 227 
 
transfers. As we discussed in Part I.B, states generally subsi-
dize the production of knowledge goods through a range of 
mechanisms beyond IP laws. By the same token, nation-states 
conceivably could use non-IP mechanisms to mediate transfers 
between consumer states and producer states. Why, then, have 
nation-states united on IP treaties rather than arrangements 
involving alternatives to IP?202 
One answer might be that alternatives to IP such as prizes, 
grants, and tax credits require some sort of public finance sys-
tem, and there is no global public finance system (or, at least, 
not much of one). Suzanne Scotchmer argued that IP treaties 
exist because “there are no institutions to harmonize public 
spending, and there are no international mechanisms to repat-
riate the spillovers it generates.”203 To be sure, there are inter-
national finance institutions with limited policy objectives, such 
as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (the lat-
ter of which has invested more than $18 billion in R&D efforts 
over the past decade).204 But this is perhaps no more than a 
quibble; a more substantive objection is that Scotchmer’s an-
swer just repeats the question. Why have countries chosen to 
coordinate on IP instead of non-IP mechanisms? It is no re-
sponse to say: because they haven’t set up non-IP mechanisms. 
This Part attempts to offer a more thorough answer to the 
“Why international IP?” question. Our account is partly ex-
planatory and partly justificatory. That is, our goal is not only 
to understand why—as a positive matter—nation-states have 
chosen international IP laws as a coordination mechanism, but 
also to explain why—as a normative matter—coordination 
around IP makes sense. Importantly, the two questions are not 
entirely separate. The puzzle of why states have chosen to co-
ordinate on IP—and why the international IP system has per-
sisted—becomes less of a puzzle the more rational that decision 
 
 202. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing such pro-
posals). We are unaware of any proposals for global treaties using non-IP in-
centive mechanisms for creative works—another indication that international 
IP scholars should be wary of lumping patents and copyright under one um-
brella. 
 203. Scotchmer, supra note 23; see also SANDLER, supra note 86, at 76 
(“The absence of a supranational government with taxing authority makes the 
standard tools of public finance . . . more difficult to apply at the transnational 
level.”). 
 204. World Bank Group Support for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 
WORLD BANK GRP., http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/world-bank 
-group-support-innovation-and-entrepreneurship (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
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seems to be. Even if our account does not perfectly describe the 
thoughts that went through the minds of government officials 
when they chose to coordinate on IP in the first place, it helps 
to explain why the regime has proven to be relatively stable. 
Our account is not a simple story about administrative 
costs. We are agnostic as to whether the administrative costs of 
the international IP regime are higher or lower than the ad-
ministrative costs of alternative coordination mechanisms. In-
deed, if the function of international IP law is to establish a 
framework for setting the size of transfers from consumer na-
tion-states to producer nation-states, then IP might seem like a 
very cumbersome means of achieving that objective. Rather 
than relying on the administrative costs justification, we in-
stead focus on two features of the international IP regime that 
strike us as normatively attractive: (1) international IP law 
leaves nation-states with significant flexibility to develop their 
own mechanisms for incentivizing innovation and allocating ac-
cess to knowledge goods; and (2) international IP law sets rea-
sonable bounds on the size of transfer payments from consumer 
nation-states to producer nation-states. 
In Part IV.A, we explain our doubts about the administra-
tive-costs justification for IP as a coordination mechanism. In 
Part IV.B, we consider alternative arguments for and against 
an international IP regime. We close in Part IV.C with a con-
sideration of the distributive effects of international IP and its 
alternatives. 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS STORY 
We have argued that the international IP system serves as 
a mechanism for setting the size of transfers between states 
that consume knowledge goods and states that produce those 
goods. Yet IP is not the only conceivable mechanism for mediat-
ing those transfers. One could imagine a regime whereby each 
nation-state agrees to contribute a fixed percentage of GDP to 
an international organization, and the organization then choos-
es promising research projects to finance with grants. Alterna-
tively or additionally, the international organization could offer 
prizes to the first inventor who comes up with a vaccine for a 
particular disease or a treatment achieving specific results. Or 
perhaps the organization could simply set the size of TBA at the 
end of each year based on each country’s consumption and pro-
duction of knowledge goods over the previous twelve months 
(e.g., “South Korea—your idea for transparent trucks was a 
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clever way to reduce road accidents, so you deserve compensa-
tion from other states”).205 
The international IP regime may have advantages over 
these alternatives, but is one of those advantages the fact that 
IP saves on administrative costs? The answer is not obviously 
“yes.” The rules of the global IP system may seem straightfor-
ward: countries are required to grant copyrights for creative 
works and patents for technical inventions for a set period of 
time (under TRIPS, no less than fifty years from publication for 
copyrights and twenty years from filing for patents),206 and are 
required to conform their IP laws to other specifications set 
forth in treaties. In practice, however, the global IP system is 
often costly and inefficient. The costs of acquiring international 
patent protection include filing fees for each jurisdiction, costs 
of local patent attorneys or other representatives, and transla-
tion costs, making the process infeasible for all but large com-
panies.207 Licensing and enforcement costs are also significant. 
We have previously estimated the administrative cost of U.S. 
patent acquisition and litigation (but not including negotiation 
and licensing costs) to be on the order of $10 billion per year.208 
Copyright is far less costly on the acquisition side due to the in-
ternational ban on copyright “formalities”209 but copyrighted 
works (unlike patents) are not indexed or searchable. This, in 
turn, leads to transaction, negotiation, and litigation costs that 
often exceed the benefit from using a copyrighted work.210 
The effectiveness of the current international IP system at 
setting the size of transfers between states also depends on 
highly variable substantive and procedural rules at the domes-
tic level. IP rightsholders have complained of difficulty enforc-
ing their rights in many countries, including not only China211 
 
 205. See Heather Kelly, Samsung Working To Make Trucks ‘Transparent,’ 
CNN MONEY (June 22, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/22/technology/ 
samsung-safety-truck. 
 206. TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 12, 33. 
 207. See TRIMBLE, supra note 80, at 35. 
 208. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 364–65. 
 209. See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 9(1) (incorporating Articles 1 through 
21 of the Berne Convention); Berne Convention, supra note 49, art. 5(2) (speci-
fying that copyrights “shall not be subject to any formality”). 
 210. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS 
DIGITIZATION (2015), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan 
-works2015.pdf (describing the high costs of finding owners for many copy-
righted works). 
 211. See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 345 (2013). 
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and India,212 but also higher-income countries such as Japan213 
and Italy.214 The availability and speed of injunctions and dam-
ages varies significantly between countries.215 
IP rightsholders also face significant uncertainty about 
whether a given knowledge good will be protected in a given 
country. Even in the United States, patentable subject matter 
and copyright fair use are difficult to specify with any preci-
sion.216 
To be clear, we are not arguing against variation in domes-
tic TRIPS implementation; there are many benefits to an ex-
pansive interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities.217 Our point is 
merely that the international IP system has significant costs 
for both private users and for nation-states that want to ensure 
their treaty partners are in compliance.218 Thus, whatever the 
justification for using IP as a coordination mechanism, it can-
 
 212. See India Last in Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement 
Rankings, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://articles.economictimes 
.indiatimes.com/2014-01-30/news/46828590_1_property-protection-india 
-protection-and-enforcement. 
 213. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and Patent Protection in 
Japan: A Half-Century of Progress, A New Millennium of Challenges, 16 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 71, 82 (2002) (“Limited discovery, limited use of expert 
witnesses, high burdens of proof of causation and damages, and the absence of 
judicial authority to increase damages for willful infringement, as well as high 
attorneys’ fees and filing fees have all been cited as features of the Japanese 
IP enforcement system that deprive IP owners of a meaningful private remedy 
for infringement in Japanese courts.”). 
 214. The defensive strategy of filing a declaratory judgment action in Ita-
ly—with its notoriously slow procedures—to delay patent litigation elsewhere 
in Europe was so widespread that it became known as the “Italian torpedo.” 
See Claudia Rehse, The ‘Torpedo’: Recent Developments in Europe, INTELL. 
PROP. MAG., Apr. 2014, at 76, 77. 
 215. See generally COTTER, supra note 211 (comparing patent remedies). 
 216. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015) (outlining recent obstacles to patenting diagnostic 
methods); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433 
(2008) (advocating for particularity in fair use decisions). Given the difficulty 
of creating one workable system of fair use, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
TRIPS does no better at standardizing limitations on copyright than a vague 
three-part test: “Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive 
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rights holder.” TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 13. 
 217. See, e.g., supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 218. In theory, it might be possible to design a system of truly global IP 
protection and enforcement, but it is not obvious that the negotiation and ad-
ministration costs of such a system would be an improvement on the status 
quo. 
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not be because coordination on IP is easy. International IP laws 
are difficult to design and even more difficult to enforce. 
Of course, alternatives to international IP cannot be im-
plemented costlessly either. But there are a number of exam-
ples of successful international coordination on incentives for 
technical knowledge beyond patent law, suggesting that alter-
natives may indeed be feasible—or at least no less feasible than 
global patent treaties. Countries have often collaborated on 
joint scientific endeavors in which they each contribute direct 
funding. The International Space Station has cost approximate-
ly €100 billion ($110 billion), split over almost thirty years 
among the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and ten Eu-
ropean countries.219 Another massive scientific collaboration, 
the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at the European Organiza-
tion for Nuclear Research (CERN), has an operating budget of 
about $1 billion per year, which was split among twenty-three 
member countries plus additional observing countries (such as 
the United States) in 2014.220 The Global Influenza Surveillance 
and Response System, a transnational network of influenza 
scientists, produces annual flu vaccines and is financed by an 
estimated $56 million a year in contributions from a number of 
nation-states.221 
Some attempt toward larger-scale cross-border coordina-
tion on R&D has been made in the European Union. Since the 
2000s, the European Commission has set broad innovation-
related framework goals, including an objective of increasing 
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP to one percent for public 
 
 219. How Much Does It Cost?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/ 
Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/International_Space_Station/How_much_ 
does_it_cost (last updated May 14, 2013); see also NAT’L AERONAUTICS & 
SPACE ADMIN., FY 2016 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST SUMMARY 1 (2015), 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NASA_FY_2016_Budget_ 
Estimates.pdf (budgeting over $3 billion per year for the U.S. contribution to 
the International Space Station). 
 220. See Alex Knapp, How Much Does It Cost To Find a Higgs Boson?, 
FORBES (July 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/07/05/how 
-much-does-it-cost-to-find-a-higgs-boson#da1eb7764f08; Don Lincoln, US Par-
ticipation in the Higgs Discovery, SYMMETRY (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www 
.symmetrymagazine.org/article/october-2013/us-participation-in-the-higgs 
-discovery; Facts and Figures 2014, CERN, http://press.cern/facts-and 
-figures/facts-and-figures-2014 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 221. Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: The Flu 
Network as a Case Study in Open Science 26–27 (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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spending and three percent for all spending.222 Although the 
specific spending goals are nonbinding, reviews have concluded 
that this framework has led to a “dramatically increased focus 
on science and technology in national political agendas”223 and 
some cross-border policy learning.224 
While nation-states have experimented with several non-
IP coordination mechanisms (and scholars have suggested still 
other possible approaches),225 this does not mean the space for 
solutions to the underinvestment problem has been thoroughly 
mined. Perhaps the most intriguing possibilities arise with re-
spect to goods for which the marginal return from additional 
investment falls to zero after a certain point. So long as one 
country invests up to that point, there is no need (and no use) 
for additional investment. For such goods, states may actually 
face an anti-coordination problem (more akin to “chicken” than 
to a prisoners’ dilemma).226 This will be the case if multiple 
countries would have an incentive to develop the good in a 
world without trade. Put differently, a chicken problem exists 
if, for multiple states Si, Bi′(x) > C′(x) for all x ≤ xglobal*, after 
which Bglobal′(x) = 0. Thus, the globally optimal outcome can be 
achieved if any one country invests xglobal*. 
Under these circumstances, too many countries have an in-
centive to develop the good, so each has some incentive to wait 
and hope the others will produce the knowledge first. In other 
words, provision of these goods is hampered by free-riding but 
not by uncompensated externalities. Since Bi′(x) > C′(x) for all x ≤ xglobal*, the fact that Bi′(x) < Bglobal′(x) is not an obstacle to opti-
mal investment. Rather, the problem is that states are prone to 
act strategically—and thus to invest less than they would un-
 
 222. See generally Ouellette, supra note 59, at 114–15 (describing this 
framework). 
 223. Nina McGuinness & Conor O’Carroll, Benchmarking Europe’s Lab 
Benches: How Successful Has the OMC Been in Research Policy?, 48 J. COM-
MON MKT. STUD. 293, 307 (2010). 
 224. REP. FROM THE EXPERT GROUP FOR THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE RE-
SEARCH ASPECTS OF THE REVISED LISBON STRATEGY, THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION IN RESEARCH POLICY: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
25–26, 29 (Jan. 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/ 
eur_23874_texte_web.pdf; see also Ouellette, supra note 59, at 115 (citing ad-
ditional sources). 
 225. See supra notes 16–17, 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 226. “Chicken” is an anti-coordination game in which the optimal outcome 
is for players to take opposite actions, but each player prefers for the other to 
take the more costly action (i.e., each would prefer to have the other country 
invest). See Prisoners’ Dilemma, supra note 33, at 1487. 
  
2016] KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND NATION-STATES 233 
 
der autarky with the hope that another country will pick up the 
slack. 
A concrete example may help illustrate. Imagine that re-
searchers identify a new chemical compound that holds prom-
ise as a cure for heart disease, and that a clinical trial to de-
termine whether the compound is effective costs an estimated 
$100 million. Given that heart disease is one of the leading 
causes of death worldwide,227 the expected benefits of conduct-
ing this trial likely exceeds its cost in many countries. Imagine, 
in a world without IP treaties or other coordination, that the 
United States, Germany, and Japan are each debating whether 
to finance the trial. Under autarky—i.e., if each country were a 
closed economy—each would immediately proceed. But given 
knowledge flows across borders, each will hope that one of the 
other countries will undertake the cost. This mutual waiting 
may have desirable effect of preventing duplicative investment. 
But it also may result in no state investing at all. 
For this type of good (which one might call chicken-type 
goods),228 one imaginable solution is an anti-R&D treaty. For 
example, if Germany and Japan can credibly commit not to fi-
nance the trial, then the good becomes a cranberry-type good 
from the perspective of the United States: either the United 
States will produce the good (which is in its interest), or the 
good won’t be produced. For the anti-R&D treaty to succeed, it 
must draw the support of all but one country with the capabil-
ity and incentive to produce the good under autarky.229 Conced-
 
 227. See Anthony S. Kim & S. Claiborne Johnston, Global Variation in the 
Relative Burden of Stroke and Ischemic Heart Disease, 124 CIRCULATION 314, 
318 fig.1B (2011) (showing that ischemic heart disease is one of the leading 
causes of death worldwide, with a burden that is relatively uniformly distrib-
uted). 
 228. Not only do these goods present a game of chicken, but knowledge 
about the health effects of eating chicken might fall into this category, given 
widespread global chicken consumption. See Roberto A. Ferdman, The Coming 
Global Domination of Chicken, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 14, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/14/the-coming 
-global-domination-of-chicken. 
 229. Alternatively, an anti-R&D treaty might draw the support of all but 
two countries with the capacity and incentive to produce the relevant 
knowledge good themselves under autarky, thus reducing the coordination 
challenge for the two remaining countries to a bilateral cooperation game. 
More generally, if n equals the total number of countries with the capacity and 
incentive to produce the relevant knowledge goods themselves under autarky, 
then an anti-R&D treaty with n – x signatories reduces the challenge of pro-
ducing the knowledge good from an n-country game to an x-country game. On-
ly when x = 1 does the anti-R&D treaty eliminate the free-riding risk, but an 
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edly, we know of no example of such an anti-R&D treaty in 
practice: countries have sought to implement anti-R&D treaties 
in other contexts (such as cloning-related research230 and nucle-
ar weapons research231), but the goal in those cases was for the 
treaty to cover all n nation-states rather than n – 1 states. Our 
point is not to push the anti-R&D treaty as a viable alternative 
to the international IP regime, but instead to emphasize that 
there are numerous imaginable solutions to distinct coordina-
tion problems for different types of knowledge goods. 
Finally, while large-scale R&D treaties (or anti-R&D trea-
ties) are not observed in the real world, tax treaties are. And 
tax treaties, like IP treaties, can address the free-rider prob-
lems highlighted by the standard account above. Countries can 
agree not to tax (or to tax at reduced rates) profits on 
knowledge goods, thus amping up incentives for innovation. In-
deed, the Model OECD Convention implements a system 
somewhat like this: if a resident of Country X receives revenue 
from the use of her patent in Country Y, she is not taxed in 
Country Y unless she “carries on business” in Country Y “in 
which the royalties arise through a permanent establishment 
situated therein and the right or property in respect of which 
the royalties are paid is effectively connected with such perma-
nent establishment.”232 
In short, we see no a priori reason why the transaction 
costs involved in negotiating and enforcing an international IP 
treaty are likely to be lower than the costs of other potential co-
ordination mechanisms. Indeed, one might think that interna-
tional IP law is quite a cumbersome way to set the size of TBA. 
If the case for international IP rests on the administrative costs 
story, it is an uneasy case indeed. 
B. A QUALIFIED DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL IP TREATIES 
In our view, a stronger argument for international IP law 
as a mechanism for setting the size of transfers from consumer 
 
anti-R&D treaty with x > 1 may still make production of the knowledge good 
more likely. 
 230. See Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Effort for Treaty Banning Cloning, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/20/world/us-drops 
-effort-for-treaty-banning-cloning.html. 
 231. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
 232. MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL ART. 12 (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 2014), http://www 
.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-articles.pdf. 
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nation-states to producer nation-states arises out of our obser-
vations in Part III regarding the separability of international 
and domestic IP policy. Those observations might translate into 
a normative argument in favor of a global IP accord along the 
lines of TRIPS: such an accord allows each signatory state to 
decide for itself how it will incentivize innovation and allocate 
access to knowledge goods at the domestic level, while also al-
lowing producer states to pass some of the production costs 
along to other countries that use knowledge goods. In other 
words, TRIPS allows each country a measure of autonomy at 
the domestic level, subject only to the constraint that no coun-
try can use a knowledge good generated in another signatory 
state without the other state’s consent (or without the consent 
of the inventor in the other state who patented the product in 
question). 
To be sure, the use of IP as a global coordination mecha-
nism does not guarantee total freedom of choice for individual 
states with respect to innovation incentives and allocation of 
access at the domestic level. As discussed above, each TRIPS 
signatory must maintain an IP system and must offer rewards 
at least as attractive as those a knowledge producer could ex-
pect from IP. A country’s right to use knowledge goods originat-
ing elsewhere also remains subject to the producer’s veto. And 
the potential for bargaining frictions is considerable, as produc-
ers and consumer nations each seek to capture the surplus 
from trade. So too, the use of IP as a global coordination mech-
anism is likely to lead to a transfer of wealth from nations that 
are primarily users to nations that are primarily producers. 
(We consider this issue in Part IV.C.) 
Moreover, this “autonomy advantage” is not entirely 
unique to IP. If, for instance, TRIPS were replaced by a global 
prize system financed by mandatory national contributions, in-
dividual countries still could adopt alternative mechanisms to 
encourage domestic innovation and still could use a price 
mechanism to allocate access to knowledge goods at the domes-
tic level. For example, imagine that a global prize fund offers a 
reward for the first team to invent a successful vaccine for the 
common cold. The United States could decide that intramural 
government research is the most promising strategy for coming 
up with a cure and could assign a group of scientists at the NIH 
to pursue the project. If the NIH scientists were the first to suc-
ceed, the federal government could claim the prize itself. And if 
the United States thought that access to the cold vaccine 
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should be allocated on a user-pays basis, it could finance its 
contribution to the global fund by imposing a tax or fee on pa-
tients who receive the vaccine. 
Other potential international policies are somewhat “stick-
ier,” in the sense that they make it harder for any one country 
to adopt a different approach. Say that countries agree to estab-
lish an international R&D organization, again funded through 
mandatory national contributions, that will dispense grants to 
university researchers across the globe who are pursuing prom-
ising projects. A country that preferred to rely on the market 
(or on intramural research) could still do so, but it would have 
no way of getting other states to share a portion of the costs. 
The country could, though, still choose how to finance its con-
tribution to the international organization—e.g., through a 
broad-based tax or through a targeted tax on knowledge goods 
that replicates the user-pays aspect of the IP system. So while 
it is not the case that all potential international innovation pol-
icies are completely separable from domestic ones, it is the case 
that convergence around an international IP regime, an inter-
national prize fund, or an international R&D organization 
would still leave wide leeway for states to choose different ways 
to finance innovation themselves. 
The international IP regime is distinct from alternative co-
ordination mechanisms such as a global prize fund or a global 
R&D organization in one important respect: as noted above, the 
transfer from a consumer nation-state to a producer nation-
state in an international IP regime (TBA) is bounded. Even 
with some amount of price discrimination, TBA ≤ BB(x). A pro-
ducer cannot charge a consumer state more than the consumer 
state stands to benefit from the producer’s knowledge good. The 
consumer state will reject any deal that requires it to pay more 
than it gets. 
To be sure, there may be cases in which a patent is granted 
for an invention that is obvious, or in which a patent is granted 
to an applicant who was not the first discoverer. Note, though, 
that consumer nation-states retain a powerful hedge against 
this risk: they can decline to grant a patent for any invention 
that is not “new” or that does not “involve an inventive step.”233 
Thus, if producer nation-state SA grants a patent to a domestic 
applicant for an “invention” that is obvious, and the domestic 
applicant then seeks protection in SB, then SB has the option to 
 
 233. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27(1). 
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deny the application.234 If SA disagrees with that determination, 
its only legal recourse is to resort to the dispute resolution 
mechanisms set forth in TRIPS.235 
No such assurance exists with respect to a global prize 
fund or a global R&D organization. As discussed above, nation-
states are likely to favor spending on knowledge goods for 
which domestic benefits are large relative to global benefits: the 
United States, for example, almost certainly has more interest 
in treating diabetes than treating diarrheal diseases (even 
though the two types of ailments kill approximately the same 
number of people worldwide each year).236 Depending on who 
controls the levers of power, a global prize fund or global R&D 
organization might divert more of its spending to “first-world 
problems” than to the dilemmas facing lesser-developed na-
tions. And it seems to us a safe assumption that wealthier na-
tions will exert outsized influence on whatever international 
institution might replace the IP regime. At the very least, the 
international IP regime has the following argument going for it: 
citizens of poorer countries don’t have to pay for knowledge 
goods that they don’t use. A global prize fund or global R&D or-
ganization financed by mandatory national contributions offers 
no such guarantee. 
Our focus on the separability of international and domestic 
innovation incentives also suggests that some of the criticisms 
of international IP law are misplaced. Consider, for example, 
Scotchmer’s worry that international IP law will lead to 
deadweight losses that could be avoided if R&D were publicly 
financed.237 This concern follows from the view that the IP 
shadow tax, as the equivalent of a concentrated sales tax, im-
poses greater deadweight losses than other innovation incentiv-
izes financed via broad-based taxation.238 But as we emphasized 
in Part III, harmonized IP protections at the international level 
do not preclude any individual nation from relying on broad-
based taxation to finance the allocation of knowledge goods at 
 
 234. Id. art. 27(1) n.5 (“For the purposes of this Article, the term[] ‘in-
ventive step’ . . . may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with . . . ‘non-
obvious’ . . . .”). 
 235. See id. art. 64. 
 236. The Top 10 Causes of Death, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who 
.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/ (last updated May 2014). Diabetes is 
much more prevalent in high-income countries, and death from diarrheal dis-
ease is much more common in low-income countries. 
 237. Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 436. 
 238. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 54. 
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the domestic level: absent a complete bargaining breakdown, a 
state will be able to purchase a license to a patented knowledge 
good from the producer at a price equal to or less than the val-
ue of the good to its own citizens, and can then choose to make 
the good available to its own citizens at marginal cost (or for 
free). So even if proprietary pricing does impose greater 
deadweight loss than broad-based taxation, that does not mean 
that harmonized IP protection is itself inefficient. 
At any rate, the assumption that proprietary pricing im-
poses greater deadweight loss than taxation does not necessari-
ly hold for all countries. The assumption depends on the exist-
ence of a reasonably efficient domestic finance system—a 
condition not everywhere found. Countries differ dramatically 
in the structure of their tax systems and in the size of the re-
sulting deadweight loss from revenue raising.239 Meanwhile, the 
deadweight loss from proprietary pricing under an IP regime 
depends on the elasticity of demand for the patented product. 
For instance, if demand is perfectly inelastic (i.e., if consumers 
will purchase the same quantity regardless of price), then the 
deadweight loss of proprietary pricing is zero.240 In that event, 
reliance on IP will be more efficient than all but the ideal tax 
system.241 
The efficiency of conventional public finance mechanisms 
versus the IP shadow tax will vary not only with the efficiency 
of the tax system, but also with other characteristics of the 
state, including both its bureaucratic capabilities and political 
economy constraints on what policies it is able to promulgate. 
Amy Kapczynski notes that the IP literature “typically de-
scribe[s] the state in its first instance as inertial, heavy, bu-
reaucratic, ill-informed, and perilously corruptible and cor-
rupt.”242 Mariana Mazzucato has recently challenged that 
pessimistic view of the state, arguing that for numerous break-
through technologies, the state has in fact acted as “a lead risk-
taker and market-shaper” rather than “an inert bandage for 
 
 239. See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the 
Size of Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293, 335 tbl.D1 (2003) (showing summary 
statistics for measures of tax efficiency). 
 240. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43 
n.11 (2004). 
 241. For a more elaborate argument suggesting that the optimal innova-
tion policy involves a mix of proprietary pricing and financing through broad-
based taxation, see E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole, Market Power Screens Will-
ingness-To-Pay, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1971 (2003). 
 242. Kapczynski, supra note 5, at 131–32. 
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areas underserved by the market . . . .”243 We do not think that 
either one of these visions will always prevail. Government-set 
rewards depend on state officials acting in the public interest, 
and are thus unlikely to succeed in nation-states with high lev-
els of corruption or inefficient bureaucracies.244 Market-set re-
wards such as tax incentives245 and patents give less discretion 
to state officials, but they still depend on the ability of the state 
to design efficient systems for screening the projects that re-
ceive either type of reward. 
The key point is this: for some products and in some coun-
tries, proprietary pricing will be more efficient than taxation as 
a means of raising revenue to finance innovation, while for oth-
er products and in other countries, the reverse will be true. We 
cannot confidently say that on balance efficiency considerations 
weigh in one direction or another in the IP-versus-non-IP de-
bate. Efficiency considerations do suggest, however, that opti-
mal innovation policy is country- and case-specific. A prize sys-
tem may be inefficient for countries in which the deadweight 
loss from taxation is high and demand for the prized invention 
is inelastic. At the same time, another country with a better-
functioning tax system—and where demand for the relevant 
knowledge good is more elastic—may want to finance innova-
tion through broad-based taxation rather than propriety pric-
ing. Thus, to the extent that efficiency arguments point in any 
direction, they point in favor of global arrangements that allow 
for diversity and maximize domestic autonomy. 
C. DISTRIBUTIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
Critics of the international IP regime frequently focus on 
the distributive consequences of IP rights.246 According to Peter 
Gerhart, “It is the distributive dimension of intellectual proper-
ty policy that makes existing international institutions such an 
 
 243. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING 
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 9–10 (2013). 
 244. Cf. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https:// 
www.transparency.org/cpi2014 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) (reporting perceived 
public sector corruption across countries). 
 245. The description of tax incentives as a “market-set reward” may sur-
prise readers unfamiliar with our prior work. Elsewhere, we have noted that 
in the case of R&D tax credits and patent boxes, “nongovernment actors decide 
which inventions are worth pursuing and which projects are most likely to 
yield the inventions in question” while “[t]he government simply enhances the 
ultimate reward.” Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 332. 
 246. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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unsound mechanism for determining global rules for intellectu-
al policy . . . .”247 Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai conclude that 
harmonization of IP protections across countries “has more to 
do with distribution than with efficiency, and that incorpora-
tion of such provisions in a treaty like TRIP[S] might well bene-
fit the North at the expense of the South.”248 
We do not dispute the claim that international IP treaties 
such as TRIPS, insofar as they strengthen IP protections in 
consumer countries, will increase the wealth of information-
producing nations. But international IP treaties are only one 
element within the constellation of policies affecting the global 
distribution of wealth. Every year, industrialized nations trans-
fer significant sums of wealth to poorer countries—through of-
ficial development assistance as well as other mechanisms. In 
2013, official development assistance from twenty-eight 
wealthy countries to poorer nations totaled $134.8 billion.249 
Wealthy countries enjoy substantial autonomy over the amount 
and allocation of their foreign aid budgets—a fact that no in-
ternational IP treaty can change. Thus, if an international IP 
treaty such as TRIPS enriches wealthy countries at the ex-
pense of their poorer counterparts, wealthy countries can offset 
that redistribution of wealth via direct transfers. Conversely, if 
TRIPS were replaced by an IP regime that shifts wealth to 
poorer countries, wealthy nations could counterbalance that 
shift by reducing their foreign aid outlays.250 At the end of the 
day, wealthy nations decide whether—and how much—they 
wish to redistribute wealth across borders. Unless a new IP re-
gime results in a North-to-South redistribution of wealth that 
exceeds the existing amount of foreign aid (a possibility we 
think unlikely),251 international IP treaties will dictate the 
form—but not the sum total—of global wealth redistribution. 
 
 247. Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 
144; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 248. Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650. 
 249. Foreign Aid Reaches Record High, THE GUARDIAN (April 8, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/08/foreign-aid 
-spending-developing-countries. 
 250. Just because wealthy nations could counterbalance redistribution 
through IP with adjustments in foreign aid does not mean that they would. As 
discussed in Parts II.C and II.D, the behavior of nation-states is not always 
best described through rational actor models, and it is possible that domestic 
lobbyists could be more successful pushing for IP rules that benefit foreign 
countries than for more direct foreign aid. 
 251. By one estimate, TRIPS resulted in a net rent transfer of $5.76 billion 
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This is not to say that the distributive consequences of in-
ternational IP treaties are nil. International IP treaties likely 
lead to transfers of wealth among industrialized nations—
transfers that cannot be offset through changes in the amount 
of foreign aid (since industrialized nations do not typically give 
foreign aid to each other).252 Some might consider such trans-
fers to be normatively desirable based on a user-pays princi-
ple.253 Others might argue that even if the distributive conse-
quences of international IP treaties are largely limited to the 
industrialized world, egalitarians ought to oppose policies re-
sulting in wealth transfers from industrialized nations with 
lower per-capita GDPs to the United States and Germany (the 
primary TRIPS beneficiaries). Note, though, that the interna-
tional IP regime does not always benefit richer industrialized 
nations at the expense of middle-income ones: some of the net 
losers from TRIPS (e.g., Norway) have higher per capita in-
comes than some of the net winners (e.g., Italy).254 The key 
point is that once one recognizes that the North-South distribu-
tive consequences of international IP treaties can largely be off-
set through adjustments to foreign aid, the normative debate 
over international IP treaties takes on a different tone. One 
might favor the redistribution of wealth from industrialized na-
tions to developing countries while also believing that user-
pays is an appropriate framework for allocating the costs of in-
formation production within the industrialized world. On that 
view, the distributive consequences of international IP treaties 
such as TRIPS begin to look quite attractive. 
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Critics of the international IP regime might respond that 
even though the distributive consequences of international IP 
law can be offset through foreign aid, political considerations 
make such offsets unlikely.255 After all, “more foreign aid” is 
rarely a winning platform plank in a rich-world democracy.256 
Yet those who criticize international IP law on distributional 
grounds bear the additional burden of showing that their pre-
ferred alternative—whether it be a global prize fund, a global 
R&D organization, or some other mechanism—would yield a 
more desirable distributive outcome. If wealthy producer na-
tion-states have managed to use international IP law to extract 
rents from consumer nation-states, what is to prevent wealthy 
producer nation-states from using a global prize fund or a glob-
al R&D organization to extract rents as well? Until critics of in-
ternational IP law can answer that question, the case against 
international IP law on distributive justice grounds will be as 
uneasy as the case for international IP law on administrative 
cost grounds. 
  CONCLUSION   
Readers of our prior work might at this point expect a re-
cantation. In an earlier article, we advocated for “innovation 
policy pluralism,” arguing that a mix of IP and non-IP incen-
tives is in most cases preferable to exclusive reliance on IP 
alone.257 Here, we defend (with qualifications) an international 
status quo that is (with exceptions) principally oriented around 
IP. Are these two positions inconsistent? 
To the contrary, we think that our analysis of international 
IP law strengthens the case for innovation policy pluralism at 
the domestic level. One concern regarding the use of non-IP in-
novation incentives at the domestic level is that nation-states 
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that subsidize knowledge production through such mechanisms 
will not be able to internalize the benefits that accrue to other 
states.258 In this Article, we have offered several reasons why 
that concern is misplaced. As we demonstrated in Part II, not 
all knowledge goods are global public goods—and even for glob-
al public goods, nation-states may have strong incentives to 
subsidize production through public finance mechanisms under 
certain circumstances. And as we showed in Part III, nation-
states that subsidize knowledge production through non-IP in-
centives at the domestic level still can use international IP law 
to secure partial compensation from consumer states. Mean-
while, international IP law leaves consumer states free to ex-
periment with non-price-based mechanisms for allocating ac-
cess to knowledge goods. And unlike IP at the domestic level, 
international IP law need not lead to any deadweight loss from 
proprietary pricing.259 
In sum, international IP law does not direct nation-states 
as to how they should incentivize innovation or allocate access 
to knowledge goods at the domestic level. Instead, the role of 
the international IP regime is to set the size of transfers from 
states that consume knowledge goods to states that produce 
them, while leaving both consumer states and producer states 
with substantial autonomy over the production and consump-
tion of knowledge goods inside their own borders. The interna-
tional IP regime thus does not supplant nation-states as the 
principal players in innovation policy. Rather, international IP 
law expands the range of innovation policy possibilities that 
nation-states can explore. 
 
 258. See id. at 367–68. 
 259. This is not to say that international coordination around non-IP 
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